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E-BUYER BEWARE: WHY ONLINE AUCTION
F'RAUD SHOULD BE REGULATED
Miriam R.Albert"
INTRODUCTION
Well-settled principles of law, such as those encompassing fraud in
its various forms, have long maintained their vitality, adapting to
changes in the legal and business environments through judicial and
legislative interpretation and intervention. Many of these changes
have manifested themselves in the world of commerce. The creation
and development of the Internet has resulted in significant changes
in the way people engage in commerce. The increasing popularity of
the Internet as a medium of commerce has generated an increase in
Internet fraud, raising new and challenging legal issues in areas
including online auctions. Under current law, a defrauded participant in an online auction transaction has no recourse against the
online auction site that facilitated and controlled the auction transac* Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham University School of
Business; LL.M., New York University, 1997;J.D. and MBA, Emory University, 1987; B.A.
Tufts University, 1984. The author would like to thank those who provided valuable
assistance: Donna Gitter, Lisa Hone and Delores Gardner Thompson ofthe Federal Trade
Commission, Assistant U.S. Attorney Chris Sonderby, and especially Dan Berick. I am also
grateful for the generous support of the Fordham University School of Business.

tion and claimed a percentage of the transaction price as its fee.
Online auction sites can and do legally disclaim any responsibility for
fraud occurring on their sites. Because of the lack of meaningful
consumer protection with respect to online auctions in the form of
consumer education efforts and appropriate regulation and effective
enforcement thereof, the rising numbers of online auction fraud
victims are left with no meaningful avenues of relief.
The Internet has existed, in various forms, since the mid-l960s,
beginning as an experiment in computer interface amongst a handful
of research institutions and evolving into the fastest-growing electronic communication tool in history, with “the potential to provide
more communicative power, purchasing capability, and knowledge
gathering outreach than print and electronic media combined.”’
Each year, the number of Internet users increases almost exponentially.’ In 1997, an estimated nineteen million Americans were using
the Internet.’ By 2000, more than 104 million Americans had access
to the Internet.’
These Internet users are doing more than checking their email and
horoscopes. They are engaging in a phenomenon known as “ecommerce”-creating a global electronic marketplace where they
purchase and seII goods and services on the Internet, either directly
from sellers’ web sites or through communities of sellers associated

‘

CCL-1Center for Communication Policy, The C C L 4 Internet Rqbott: 4n~gin~g
thelh$al
Futu~e,4,at h t t l ’ : / / ~ ~ ~ ~ . c r p . u c l a . e d u / ~ ( ~ I ~ ~ - I i t t e n i e t - R e p o (Oct.
r t - ~ O25,
O ~2000)
.p~f
[hereinafter 7he CCLA Internet RepoTf].
Id.
‘ Id.; .see tz00 Pew Iriternct and . h e n c a n Life Projcct, ‘More Online, Doing More, at
I i t t I ’ : / / \ ~ \ ” . u . . I ” w i r i t c . n l c t . o r ~ / ~ e l ~ ~ ~ s / r ~ l ( 1.~5~ ~iFeb.
c . ~ s i18,
~ ~ ‘LOO
i [ ~ =I); Number of J V ~
Internet I’sers U Grouing, N.Y. Tl.\lt;s. Frb. 19, 2001. at C-3.
Internet participants include hosts in addition to uscrs. In 1984, the domain name
system w a introduced, and the number of hosts exceeded 1,000. By 1992, the number of
hosts had exreedrd one million. and by 1996, the number of hosts neared ten million. See
Li/e on the Internet: Aet ‘fiinehnc, at http://wuu..pbs.or~/ir~ternet/tir~~eline/tim~line-txt.html
‘last visited Mar. 9, 20021.
Ste Prepared Statement oftht Federal Trade Comrnision on ‘TnternetFraud” BefDre the Subcommittee
on Commerce, Trade. and Comuner Protection o J t h Committee on Bier9 and Commerce, 107th Cong.
2 (2001I (statementof Eileen Harrington, .Associate Director of rhe Division of Marketing
Practices in the Frderal Trade C~ommission’sBureau of Consumer Protection), nuailable at
htt~://~~.ftc.gov/os/2OOl/05/intemetfra~1dttm)-.htnl
$last visited Mar. 9, 2002)
bereinafter f f C Slalemtnt on 171kmel Fraud].
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through online auction sites.5 This global electronic marketplace has
grown rapidly, and that pace of growth is expected to continue,6
rising from an estimated 962.6 billion in 1996 to an estimated $220
billion by the end of 200 1.7 Analysts predict that by the year 2002,
e-commerce will account for more than $300 billion ofthe U.S. gross
national product.8 Global e-commerce revenue is estimated to reach
$3.2 trillion by 2003, constituting almost five percent of all global
sales."
One form of e-commerce, the online auction, has become
increasingly popular since it first appeared in 1995.'' Over 1.3
million transactions per day take place on online auction sites." The
number of online auction participants was projected to be 6.5 million

More than half (50.7"/0)of Internet users have made a purchase online. See UCLA
Internet Report, supra note 1, at 10. Just 4.5% of all Internet users are responsible for 3 1.4"/~
of all online purchases. 8.9% of purchasers buy online weekly, while 28.5"/0 buy online
monthly. The average amount spent online per month by Internet buyers is $1 13with 3.5'10
of users spending more than $500 per month online. Id. at 41,46; see also Consumer Protection
in Cyberspace: Combating Fraud on the Internet: Before the Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection Subcommittee ofthe House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 3 (1998) (statement of
Eileen Harrington, Associate Director of the Division of Marketing Practices in the Federal
Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
1998/9806/test.623.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002) [hereinafter F1CStutement on Consumer
Protection].
See Thomas J. Smedinghoff & Ruth Hill Bro, Moving with Change: Electronic Sgnature
Legislation as a VehicleforAdvancinge-commerce, 17J. MAKSHALLJ. COMPUTER &INFO. L. 723,
725 (1999); see also James M. Snyder, Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All ?hg
Shouldor Could to St@ Online Fraud?, 52 FED.COMkf. L.J. 453,456 (2000);FTC Chaiman Rob&
Rtoj%y's Opening Remarks at Workshop on Consumer Protection in the Global Electronic Market 1,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 1999/9906/globalpitof.htm (June 8, 1999).
' See FTC Statement on Consumer Protection, supra note 5, at 3; see also Fraud Could Slow Growth
ofElectronic Commerce: FTC, 1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 1998/9806/ehpress.htm
(June 25, 1998).
* See 7 I e L . u ~OfCybenpace, 112 HARV.L. RE\.'. 1574, 1577 (1999).
' See Linda Himelstein et al., why 7hg'reJVutsAbout the.Net, Bus. WL, Nov. 23, 1998, at
52 (citing market research firmJupiter Communications).
l o See Internet Auctions: A Guide For Buyers and Selhs 1, available at http://www/ftc.gov/bcp/
conline/pubs/online/auctions.htm (lastvisited Mar. 9,2002) [hereinafter Internet Auctions: A
Guide].
I ' See Intonet Auction Fraud 4, 13, available at http://www.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/Auction
FraudReport.pdf (May 200 1) [hereinafter Internet Auction Fraud Report].
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by the end of 2000.” As of January 2001, that projection was
dramatically exceeded, with 35 million people participating in online
auctions.”’ Online auctions constitute a $6.4 billion per year industry,
with that figure estimated to increase to $15.1 billion per year by
2004.’+ As the number of online auction participants rises, the
potential for, and number of, online auction complaints rises as well.
The increased popularity of the Internet and the huge volume of
e-commerce transactions have generated opportunities for cyber
crimes and torts, including various forms of Internet fraud.16 The

’’

‘l’ See John Hendren. Fraud Can Taint Online Auctions, BCFFALO
NLWs, Feb. 9, 1999, at 8E
(citing market research firm Jupiter Communications). This trend in online auction
participation is not limited to the United States. See Mike .4nderiesz, Go M e r e theAuction Is,
S~()H.\IAS, Oct. 4, 1999, at 22; see also Judith H. Dobrzynski, The Bidding Game: A Special
Repofl; In OnlineAuction IVorld, HoaxesAren’t E q to See, N.Y. TIliES, June 2,2000, at A1 (citing
market research firm Jupiter Communications) [hereinafter 7he B i d d i q Game]. However,
differences in the various countries’ laws make a comprehensive analysis of online fraud on
a global basis beyond the scope of this article. Seegenmal&Americn Online’s Response to the Federal
Trade Commicsion’s Requestf w d c a d m i c P a p and Atblic Comments 1, nonilable at http://www. ftc.
gov/bcp/icpw/comments/aol.htm (Mar. 26, 1999i.
I ” See Online duction Sunlg, Summay, at http://www.nclnet.org/onlineauctions/auction
survey200 1.htm Uan. 3 1,200 1 ).
I’ See Marty Jerome, Biddm Beware Online, BOSIOY GI.ORE, July 9, 2000, at 535 (citing
market research firmJupiter Communications); see alsoJim Carlton & h i - w i n g Tam, Online
J., May 12,2000, at B6 (quoting Paul Luehr,
Auctioneers Face GroWrng Fraud Problem, WA~.I.SI-.
an assistant director at the Federal Trade Commission).
‘j See Hendren, supm note 12; see also inja notes 36-47 and accompanying text; Tom
Holland, Eliminating Online Auction Fraud at http://www.auctionwatch.corn/awdaily/view
point/speakout/amazon-fraud.html(.\us. 30, 1999).
I‘j See fTC Statement on Internet bud, supra note 4,at 2; see also Revolution in Internet Commerce
is “Proj?mnd& Ro-Comer”I3to& Says 1, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/02/wilson.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2002). According to the Department of-Justice:
In general, the same type of fraud schemes that have victimized consumers and
investors for many years before the creation of the Internet are now appearing online
(sometimeswith particular refinements that are unique to Internet technology.)With
the explosive <growthofthe Internet, and e-commerce in particular, online criminals
try to present fraudulent schemes in ways that look, as much as possible, like the
goods and services that the vast majority of legitimate e-commerce merchants offer.
In the process, they not only cause harm to consumers and investors, but also
undermine consumer confidence in legitimate e-commerce and the Internet.
Internet Fraud, at 3, aoailable at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/Internet.htm
(last
visited Mar. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Internet Fraud]; x e also Carlton & Tam, mpra note 14;
Jerome, supra note 14. Some of these schemes are simply variations on age-old scams, just
relocated to cyberspace. O t h e n are newly created for, and could only exist in, cyberspace.
See Tony Wanless, Age-old S c a m ‘firive Online: the Zntnnet is Hauling in the Suchs and Fraud is
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Internet offers low-cost communication, the capacity to reach a global
audience, and a presumptive veneer of credibility stemming from the
anonymity of cyberspa~e.’~
Thus, Internet users may find it hard to
distinguish genuine sources of information from fraudulent sources,
creating a fertile environment for all kinds of Internet fraud.I8
“Internet fraud” is a broad term, referring generally to any kind of
fraud scheme using a component of the Internet, be it chat rooms, email, message boards, or Web sites, to “present fraudulent solicitations to prospective victims, to conduct fraudulent transactions, or to
transmit the proceeds of fraud to financial institutions or to other[s]
connected with the scheme.”I9 Other common forms of Internet
fraud include online retail schemes, online business opportunity/
“work at home” schemes, online identity theft and fraud, online
market manipulation schemes, and online auction fraud.”
This article examines the most commonly reported form of
Internet fraud, online auction fraud.2’ Part I discusses fraud in the
context of online auctions, highlighting the increasing numbers of

Hard to Prove, GAZETTE,
Dec. 4,2000, at F3; see also Alan L. Zegas, Cybercrime’s Many Faces,
N.J. L.J., May 1,2000, at 24; About Internet Fraud Watch, at http://www.fraud.org/internet/
intinfo.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
” See Reportjom the National Consumers &ague to the US. Department of3ustice Concerning
Telemarketing and Internet Fraud 2, available at http :/ / www. fraud.org/ telemarketing/
fraudrep.htm (Jan.10, 2000) [hereinafter NCL Report];see also Christian Berthelsen, Online
Sept. 26, 2000, at 4;
Crime is Easy, But Ojen Easier to Crack, SAN DIECOUNION-TRIB.,
Jonathan J. Rusch, Don’t LookNow, 9 GEO. MnsoN L. REV. 289,314 (2000).
18
See Internet Fraud, supra note 16, at 2; Snyder, supra note 6, at 465.
19
Internet Fraud, supra note 16, at 19; see also &-Line Fraud and Crime: Are Consumers Safe?
Hearings Before the HouseSubcomrn. on Commerce, Tradeand ConsumerProtection 107th Gong. (2001),
available at http://www.nclnet.org/susantestimony5230
1.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002)
(testimony of Susan Grant, Director of the Internet Fraud Watch, Vice President, Public
Policy, National Consumers League). The Federal Trade Commission created a list of the
top ten Internet frauds of 1998, characterized as “dot-cons,” some of which are as old as
fraud itself, including: online auction transactions, general merchandise sales, computer
hardwardsoftware sales, Internet-related services, work-at-home plans, business
opportunities/franchises, multi-level marketing/pyramid schemes, credit card offers and
advance fee loans, andjob listing/employment offers. SeeNCLReport, supra note 17, at 2; see
ROCKY MT. News, Nov. 1 1,2000, at 60A.
also Online Trapsfor the Unway, DENVER
See Internet Fraud, supra note 16, at 3. The term “Internet fraud” is broad enough to
include forms of fraud that are more of an administrativeissue for online auction sites, such
as fraud in the bidding process. See inja notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
A detailed discussion of the other forms of Internet fraud is beyond the scope of this
article.

*’
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reported cases and the most common forms of online auction fraud.
Part I1 examines two prominent online auction fraud cases, and
illustrates the critical need both to protect consumers from being
victimized by online auction fraud and to provide opportunities for
meaningful relief in the event that consi.imcrs are so virtirni7~d.Part
I11 offers suggested areas for regulation to protect consumers from
online auction fraud, and further provides an examination and
evaluation of the responses to online auction fraud by various
consumer and law enforccmerit cgroups. Part IV examines the
response of online auction sites to online auction fraud." Part V is an

.%

>

eBay.com is the undisputed giant of the onlinc auction world. As a result, much of the
analysis in this article uses eBay as the indust? slandard and representative of all other
online auction sites. To tlie extent an)- particular online auction site differs from eBay in any
relevant respect, such differences are pointed out.
eBay is so dominant as to make it tlie defining voice on policies and procediires among
online auction sites. In fact, according to eBay, many of its competitors use its policies and
procedures, as \\.ell as its documentation, on their o ~ irival
i
sites, sometimes right down to
the typographical errors. See David Strcitfeld? E.r-,brusecutor Polices ?Bay, CHI. SLY-'I'lhlk;S,
Dec. 14, 1999, at 46 lqiioting Robert Chestnut, Associate General Counsel for eBay).
Founder Pierre Omidyar created rBay in 1995 as a vehicle to sell his theri-girlfriend's
Pez dispensers. See Hendren, m p a note 12. eBay now has over ninety percent of the online
auction market. dwarfing its closest rivals Yahoo! and .biazon.com. See The Bidding Game,
mpm note 12.
According tn Media Xletrix, a firm that measures Internet usage, eBay began 2000 as
the Internet's number-one shopping site: eBay's average daily reach (defined as the percent
of all Internet iisers~exceeded 6.5",". beating the second most popular site by fifty-eight
percent. See Robert Scally, The Auction ~,~etu,ork
.M&g
Bid for &-Line Dominance, DSN
REk'.4ii.I\(; TOl):\Y at l i t t p : / / ~ ~ ~ . f i n d a ~ i c l e s . c o m / c f ~ O / n t O ~ P / 9 ~ ~ 9 / 6 3 8 0 0 0 3 5 /
printljhtml M a y 8, 20001
file with author!. O n a typical day, 1.8 iriillion visitors entcr
the site. SPPl%\\Xl BL-SXI.I.. THEEB..\\I' PHE\'O\LCNOs 4 i'LOO0).
eBay, the self-proclaimed "world's largest personal online trading commurlity" has over
8,000 categories of items up for auction. with 34.1 million registered users. 1112000, eBay's
artiiualized gross merchandise sales ;the valua of goods traded on the site) exceeded $5
billion. Ste dbout d 3 y Compn?~ Oremm: Inde.~. at http://pages.ebay.com/comrnun;ty/
aboutebay/oven;iew/index.html!last visited %far.9,2002'8: see also -\dam Cohen, eBq's Bid
to Conquer '411, Tl\w.. Feb. 5. 2001. at 48; 7he Standnrd: e B q Inc., at h t t p : / / w . t h e
staridard.corri/compariies/clussier/O,
1922,2808 1S.htnil I last visited Mar. 9,2002); Michelle
Dririrrliy. RecardRclmmfor &y, at h t t p : / / w u ~ . a u c . t i o r w a ~ ~ l ~ , c o I r ~ / e m ~ l / p r i n t . h t m l ? r e t =
/awdail~-/clailynews/jiil~~l/
1-07 190 1.IitIril July 19, 2000). Unlike many Internct
mrerprises, eBay continues to ,grow and succeed, amiallv making money. For the year
ending Dccember 3 I , 1999, eBay's net revenues were $224.7 million, up 16 1"/0 from net
revenues of $86.1 million for fiscal year 1998. Net inrome for 1999 was $10.8 niillioli, or
8 cents per sliarr o n a diluted basis. See Scally, supm. For the year ending December 3 I ,
--

1011

2002 / On-Line Fraud / 581
examination of some forms of online alternative dispute resolution.
Because of the lack of meaningful consumer protection stemming
from the lack of appropriate regulation and effective enforcement
thereof, and the dearth of consumer education with respect to online
auction fraud, online alternative dispute resolution remains one of the
only available avenues of relief for victims of online auction fraud.

I. FRAUD IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET
Fraud is one of the oldest causes of action in American jurisprud e n ~ e . *The
~ term “fraud” is a generic term describing any of the
variety of ways a party can lie or suppress the truth for personal
gain.24 In general, a successful plaintiff must show the defendant’s
misrepresentation of a past or present material fact. The defendant
must be shown to have had scienter and the intent to induce reliance
by the plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff must demonstrate herjustifiable
reliance on the misrepresentation. 25 Fraud includes claims of
fraudulent inducement, when a party is enticed into the contract
through misrepresentation or fraud, as well as fraud in the factum,
when the fraud occurs during the process of obtaining execution or
delivery.26

A. Online Auction Fraud in General
The application of the principles of fraud in the context of the
Internet poses complicated and important issues. Internet fraud has
particular resonance in the context of online auctions, with fraud
occurring both during the bidding process and after the bidding

2000, eBay’s net revenues were $430 million, up 92% over fiscal year 1999. See Cohen,
supra. For the third quarter of 2001, eBay had net revenue of $194.4 million, a 7 1% increase
over the $1 13.4 million it earned in the same quarter of 2000. eBay’s net income for the
quarter was $18.8 million. See eBay, Inc. (Luarterb FinancialsHoover’s Online, at http://www.
hoovers.com/quarterlies/7/0,2 167,56307,OO.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
23 See 1 WARRENFREEDMAN,
THEBUSINESSTORI’
OFFRAUDAND MISREPRESENTATION
iii ( 1989).
74 The common law fails to define fraud, with the prevailing wisdom holding that fraud
would be better left undefined. See id. at 1 (quoting Professor Melville Bigelow); see aOo 37
C.J.S. Fraud3 2 (1997).
S~~DANB.DOBBS,THELAWOI:TORTS§~~O
(2000);seealso 37 C.J.S. Frauds 7 (1997).
See 37 AM.JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit 5 2 (2001).

‘‘

’”
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process has been completed.27 Online auction sites provide a venue
for sellers to conduct auctions of goods." There are considerable
differences in the means and volume of online auctions as opposed to
traditional auctions.2" Unlike traditional auctions, where the parties
or their representatives are in the room with the offered merchandise,
online auction sites use the Internet to conduct a virtual auction
where the parties never meet and the buyer has no opportunity to
examine the offered goods.30 Further, the volume of online auctions
is many times greater than that of traditional auctions."' Unlike
traditional auction houses, the online auction sites do not take title to
or handle the goods bought or sold using the medium of the

'Y See Internet Fraud, supra note 16; .XP also h'CL Report, m p u note 17, at 2; igra notes 53-59
and accompanying text.
S e e B q s Response to the Federal Trade Commission's Requestfor Academic Pupers and Public
Commenb 3, azzihbknt http:/ /www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comrients/ebay.htm (Mar. 26, 1999)
bereinafter e B q i Re.$onx to tlle FTCJ.
Inteniet auctions are bazaars. In most cases, sellers oKer one item at a time, but
sometimes sellers offer multiple lots of the same item. T h e auction web sites often
refer to auctions of multiple items as ''Dutch'' or "English" auctions. At some sites,
the seller may be required to sell all items at the price ofthe lowest successful hid. At
other sites, the seller is entitled to the prices bid by each of the highest bidders.
Occasionally. Internet auction sellers set a "resenre price," which is the lowest price
they will accept for an item. Some sitvs disclose the reselve price during the auction.
The bidding for each auction closes at a scheduled time, when the highest bidder
iiWiIIS,>?
In the c a ~ of
e the sale of multiple lots, the participants with the highest bids
at the close of the auction are obligated to buy the items. If no one bid at or above
the reserve price, the auction closes without a "winnu." .+t thc close of a successful
auction, the buyer and seller cornniunicate~usuallyby email-to arrange for
payment arid deliver). of goods.
Internet Auctiom: A Guide, supra note 10. at 1.
"'.' See Mary Kay Finn et al., Policies Cnder&ing Congressional Approual of Criminal and Ciuil
Imrniiniryfor Interartiie Computer Stnice Proziders L'nder Roi*iiiomoftlie Comrnunicatiom Decency Act
Of/YYtiShou[d E-Bgyers Bar:a7e?, 31 U. Toi.. L. REV. 347, 370 (2000).
,"' In traditional auctions you could meet the buyer and seller and inspect the tnrrchandise. -At the very least? you could make sure the merchandise actually existed.
In onliric auctions, however, you don't liriuw who the seller is, where he is, or whether
the offered items even exist. . h d all too often, they do not.
Brian Krebs, F7C,ekc to Stnn OnlirteAirction Fraud, NF.\VSBYIW
(Feb. 14,2000)(quoting U.S.
Attoriiry Christopher Paintcr), af http://www.iirwsbytes.com/ciS-bin/ .../im.display.
priritable?client.id=newsbytes&story.id-14382.
"' Seesupra notes 1 1-14 and accompanying text; seeulso Finn et al.,supra note 29, at 371.

''
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interne^^' Thus, online auctions have the potential for abuses not
likely or, in some cases, even possible, with traditional auctions.33For
example, in the typical online auction, the seller is the only participant with access to the offered item. The buyer relies on the seller’s
written description, and in some cases, on a digital photograph of the
offered item. So, an online auction seller could list an item for sale
that differs materially from the description provided, or could list an
item for sale that does not even exist. Further, as a practical matter,
the large numbers of transactions listed with online auction sites as
opposed to traditional auction houses necessitates less attention to
each transaction by the online auction house. Also, because online
auction sites do not take title to the offered items, and under current
law have no liability for fraud occurring on their sites, the online
auction sites have little incentive to take steps to prevent fraud on
their sites. In fact, the online auction sites consistently disclaim any

32 See eBay’s Response to the m
C, supra note 28, at 3. Traditional auction houses like
Sotheby’s offer a guarantee of the accuracy of its descriptions of offered items, for both its
traditional and Internet auctions. The owner ofthe property transfers it to the auction house
to act on the owner’s behalf for the sale at auction. See Sothebys.com-Help- Rtfirence, at
http://www.sothebys.com/help/ref/ref_liveterms.html (last visited Mar. 9,2002).
According to Sotheby’s website, the auction house “stand[s] by the accuracy of our
bold-type description of authorship (see below) of each lot for a period of five years. A buyer
who disputes the correctness of our lot description has recourse through a process set forth
in each catalogue.” Id. The auction house guarantee is not without limits:
In addition to other exclusions described in the catalogue, we cannot guarantee the
authorship of paintings, drawings and sculpture created before 1870. There are also
other limitations and exceptions to our standard guarantee that apply to particular
types of property. If such exceptions apply, they will appear in the catalogue for the
sale.
Zd.
It should also be noted that traditional auctions are not without treachery. For
example, the concept of “shill bidding” was invented to describe conduct involved with offline auctions. SeeJeff Faerber, Some Feel SnookeredAmidAuction Hurb-Burh, MIAMIHERAID,
Aug. 23, 1999, at 11BM; see also infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
53
One commentator observes:
Consumer auctions on the Web are booming and, as they become more entrenched,
they’re spawning a variety of dubious practices, from outright scams to the posting of
deceptive information. Though many of these tricks are centuries-old, observers say
the relative anonymity of online trading environments gives people the latitude to pull
off newer scams they couldn’t get away with at live auctions.
Faeber, supra note 32.

584 / Vol. 39 / American Business LawJournal
responsibility for the risk of fraud on their sites.:" The risk of such

"' eBay's User .\greement contains thr temis and conditions applicable to using the site
and is rife with disclaimers:
.Although we are conimonly referred to as ail online auction website, it is important
to realize that we are not a traditional "auctioneer." Instead, our site acts as a venue
to allow anyone to offer. sell, and buy just about anything, at anytime, from
anywhere. in a \.ariety of formats, including a fixed price format and at auction-style
forniat corninonly referred to as an "online auction." We are not involved in the
actual transaction between buyers and sellers. .\s a result, we have n o control over
the quality. safet). or legality of the items advertised? the truth or accuracy of the
listings, the ability of sellers to sell items or the ability of buyers to buy items. W e
cannot ensure that a buyer o r seller will actually complete a transaction.
e B q C b r .4gmnunt 3 3.1, 02 http://pages.eba~.con~/trelp/comtnuniry/p~ig-user.htmi
(last
visited Mar. 9, 2002'.
I11 addition. the eBay Lser .\greetnetit disclaims any warranties, express or implied,
with respect to the site and services:
WE .WD OLIR SUPPLIERS PROVTDE OUR WEB SITE XVD SERVICES ".4S
IS" :\ND IYIIHOUT .L\T \.V.\RR.INTY OR CONDITION, EXPRESS,
IMPLIED OR ST;ITUTORY. \YE .XYD OUR SUPPLIERS SPECIFICALLY
DISCL.\IAI Ah" IMPLIED \V.ARR.L\TES OFTITLE, MERCHANTABILITY,
wrxss FOR A P.-\K-I'ICC'L-~RPURPOSE AND NOK-INFRINGEMENT.
Some states d o 1101 allow, the disclainier of implied warranties, so the foregoing
disclaimer ma)- not apply to you. This warranty gives you specific legal rights and you
may also have other legal rights which vary from state to state.
Id. 8 1 1. The eRay User ;\greemcnt further lirrrits the site's liability:
IN NO EVENT SH&\LLIVE O R OUR SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR LOST
PROFITS O R -WY SPECI.lL, INCIDENTAIL O R CONSEQUENTIAL

D.\Sf=\GES ARISING O U T OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH OUR SITE,
OUR SERVICES O R THIS AGREEMENT (HOWEVER ARISING,
INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
OUR LI.\BILITl', .AND 'I'HE L J A B I L I OF
~ OUR SUPPIJERS, '1.0 YOU OR
-kXY THIRD P.lRTIES IN .LYY CXRCL'MSTXWC~EIS LIMITED TO THE
GRE:ITER OF m-4,THE AbIOUNT OF FEES YOU P.4Y TO US IN THE 12
MOSTHS PRIOR TO THE .\CTIOS GI\'ING RISE TO LIA4BILITY,i\ru'D (B)
1.

S 100. So~ricStates do not allow the limitatioti

of liability, so the foregoing limitation

o r exclusion may not apply to you.

Id.

8

12.
Further. ?Bay disclaims responsibility for authenticating any party's identity and
suggests users consult the "user-initiated feedback system" and to communicate directlywith
potential trading partners. See in@i notes 2 10-1 3 and accompanying text. eBay mentions
the availabilin of third party escrois sewices or seivires that provide additional user
verification. ,EPP PRCYl'sur Agreonnrl, suprn note 34. 5 3.2; see alro i n j a notes 195-200 a d
accoInpanying text.
eBay requires its users to release eBay arid all its offirers, directors, agents, subsidiaries,
and employees from "any claims, denlands and damages {actualand consequential) of every
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fraud has, to date, been borne by the defrauded online auction
participants, typically the successful bidder, because under current
law a fraud action cannot be sustained against an online auction site.
The online auction sites consider themselves simply venues where the
true parties to a transaction can meet and decide how much risk they
want to assume in any given online auction transaction. To date, no
court has found othe~wise.~’

B. Escalating Numbers $Online Auction Fraud Cases
Industry experts predict a veritable explosion of fraud cases as the
number ofonline auction participants continues to increase.“”Online
auction fraud is already the most frequently reported form of Internet
fraud-ten times as common as the second and third most reported

kind and nature, known and unknown, suspected or unsuspected, disclosed or undisclosed,
arising out of or in any way connected with such disputes.” e B y UserAgreement, supra note 34,

9 3.3.

’,’

See Hendren, supra note 12. eBay recently won a dismissal of a class action suit by
purchasers ofautographed sports memorabilia later discovered to be fake, who claimed that
eBay had a responsibility to “ensure the authenticity of items sold through its Web site.” See
eB&s Liabilip is Cleared in Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2001, at C14. According to eBay’s
Associate General Counsel, Rob Chestnut, the company’s role is like that of a newspaper’s
classified advertising section, that eBay simply provides a forum. Id. Had the lawsuit been
successful, eBay would have been forced to take a more active role in policing its site for
fraud. See David Baranowski, Fraud CaseAgainst e B y Proceeds, at http://www.auction watch.
com/email/print.html?ret= /awdaily/dailynews/octobe.. ./2- 101600.htm (Oct. 16,2000)
(on file with the author).
36 See Robin Fields, Some E-Auction Users Get Less Than niy Bargain For; Internet: Fraud Has
Escalated at Online Bidding Sites, Prompting Law Enforcement and Searip Crackdoums, LA. Trxf Es,
Mar. 16,2000, at A l ; see alsoJVCL Report, supra note 17, at 2. According toJodie Bernstein,
Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consunier Protection:
We know that with the dramatic expansion of e-commerce, Internet auction sites are
experiencing amazing growth. We also know that the number ofcomplaints the FTC
has received about Internet auctions is exploding-from 107 in 1997 to 10,700 in
1999. We want Internet auction users and the online auction industry to know that
the e-con artists who capitalize on them are ‘going, going, gone.’ We don’t intend to
let a handful of rogues erode consumer confidence in Internet commerce or Internet
auctions.
Late, Enforcm Target Internet Auction Fraud, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2Q00/02/
internetauctionfraud.htm (Feb. 14, 2000); see also Anderiesz, supra note 12; David Rovella,
Justice Department Preparesfor a C y b m a r , N.Y. L.J., Mar. 14,2000, at 5; see also Wanless, supra
note 16.
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kinds of Internet fraud combined.17 Consumers have a number of
venues for reporting Internet fraud."" 'The primary venues for
reporting Internet fraud cases are the National Consumers League
initiative called the Internet Fraud Watch (IFW)3"and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC)."
The IFM' was launched in 1996 to help consumers distinguish
legitimate promotions from fraudulent promotions, and to serve as a
mechanism to route reports of suspected fraud to the appropriate law
enforcement agencies.'' Consumer complaints to the IFW increased
by 600% from 1997 to 1998, with online auctions complaints
numbering almost 5500, or 68% of all 1998 complaints, up from 26%
for 1997." Consumers lost more than $3.2 million to Internet fraud,

See Fields. supra notr 36; see ako .Anita Kuniar, Online Auction Scarns Mult$b, SFI.
TI.\II:s?July 17, 2000, at IB: jVCL Report, mpra note 17, at 2.
The next most popular v p e of Intcrnet complaint reported to the Federal Trade
Commissiun involves disagreemeiits over the rights to domain names-a part ofan Internet
address. The Internet Corporation for .%signed Names and Numbers ( 1 C . W is a nonprofit corporation set up by the federal government to oversee the distribution of these
domain names. IC.LIN adopted a uniform set of policies to govern all domain name dispute
resolutions; these policies. the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and its
accompanying rules, became effective in October 1999. See L'nijioform Domain Dispute ResoluCion
Polig, at http://~cuu..icar1ri.urg/udrp/udrp-policy-240ct99.l1tm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002)
'I1' h search of the Internet for the term "Internet f r a u d using two of the major search
engines. Google.com and Ya.hoo.com., generated. in the first page of results, links to the
National Fraud Infomiation Center, Internet Fraud Watch, and the Internet Fraud
Co~nplaint Center, all sites where consumen can report Internet fraud.
See
http://searcli.~alioo.corn/bin/search?p=internet+fraud(last visited Mar. 9, 2002) (on file
with authori; see d o http:/ /google.corn/search?q=internet+fraud&btriG=Google+search
(last visited Mar. 9, 2002) (on file with author;.
"" The National Consumers Iaague created the IFCV to vpcrate in tandmi with its
Kational Fraud Infomiation Center ihTFICI. SeeAbout Internet Fraud Watch, supra note 16; see
ako inja notes 14i-49.
$11
See http://cvww.ftc.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 20021; see aLro Snyder, supra note 6, at 454.
In addition, the NFlC web site has links to governmental sites and states attorneys general
to report incidents of fraud.
See Contacting f l i t Jkifiunal Fraud Information Cenler, at
Iittp://www.fraud.org/info/contactnfic,htni
I last visited Mar. 9,2002).
I ' See Berthelsen, supra note 17; see aDo hntional Consumers League W a r n Consumers M
illions
Are Lost to Internet Fraud, at http://Mu.w.fraud.org/intemet/99finaI.htm (Feb. 16, 2000)
[hereinafter JVCL W a r n Conmmprs] .
I' The increase in the number of cornplaints can be attributed to several factors. As
the number ofWeb sites devoted to online auctions increases, it is predictable that the
number offrauds occurring on those Web bites will likewise increase. Currently, well
over one hundred online auction sites are dedicated to bringing together consuniers
"

PI:'I't.:Kbt3L-K(;
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based on incident reports filed with IFW in 1999.'j As of October
1999, 90% of consumer complaints to the IFW pertained to online
auctions.44
The FTC acts as a clearinghouse for Internet fraud complaints,
using its Consumer Sentinel program to collect complaints from over
300 law enforcement agencies and consumer groups, including
IF'W.45 The FTC has also seen an increase in online auction
complaints from 106 in 1997 to 10,872 in 2000, exceeding even the
rapid growth of the online auctions them~elves.~~
For the first quarter
of 200 1,the FTC received 1,442 online auction corn plaint^.^^
These numbers may be understating the extent of the problem.
Many victims of online auction fraud do not file corn plaint^.^^ In
addition, these figures do not take into account any complaints filed

with other consumers as well as businesses with consumers.
Snyder, supra note 6, at 455-6; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n 1, Going, Going Gone... Luw
Enforcement Eflblts to Combat Internet Auction Fraud, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/reports/intauction.htm (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Going, Going, Gone];Anderiesz, supra note 12;NCLReport,
supra note 17, at 3.
'' See NCL Warn Consumers, supra note 41.
44 See Elizabeth Weise, Ep: Protect YourseJfBejirePaying For Items, U.S.A. TODAY,
Mar. 10,
1999, at 2A, see also Going Once, Going Lice.. . Scammed! Online Auctions Named the Number One
Internet Fraud Complaintfor 1998, at http://www.fraud/org/internet/9923stat.htm(Feb. 23,
1999) [hereinafter Going Once, Going T'ce].
45 The NFIC forwards complaints it receives on its site and the IFW site to the FTC's
Consumer Sentinel program. See Consumer Sentinel Members, at http://www.consumer.gov/
sentinel/members.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002); see also inja notes 86-87 and
accompanying text.
Calrmdar Ear j o m 1997 to 2001 (June 15, 200 1)
46 See Internet Auction Complaints
bereinafter Internet Auction Complaints] (on file with the author). The number of complaints
filed with the FTC actually decreased from 13,901 in 1999 to 10,872 in 2000. The total
number ofcomplaints for 2000 is still alarmingly large in absolute terms, and as a percentage
of all Internet fraud complaints. Delores Gardner Thompson of the FTC attributes the
reduction to several factors including better-informed participants and efforts by law
enforcement and by some online auction sites. Of course, defrauded consumers beyond the
10,872 may be filing their complaints with entities other than the FTC,perhaps at the state
or local level. See Andy Roe, Online Auction Fraud Declines, at http://www.auctionwatch.
com/email/print.html?ret=/awdaily/dailynews/aprilO1/ 1-041701 .html (Apr. 17,2001).
i7 See Internet Auction Complaints, supra note 46.
See IntemetAuctionFraud Repod,supra note 1 1, at 5; see also 7heInternet Fraud Complaint Center
Six-Month Data Trends Report: M y 8-Noumber 8, 2000, at 3, at http://www.ifccfbi.gov/
strategy/6monthreportt.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Trends R@7rt].
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at the state or local level."!' The average consumer loss in an online
auction transaction in 2000 was approximately $478,'" a figure so
small that it may have discouraged defrauded participants from

pursuing any action, however limited, which gives fraud investigators
limited incentive to expend significant resources on any particular
case:" Few people will undertake a formal recovery process if the
cost of recovery exceeds the cost of the fraud.52

C. Common Forms of Online Auction Fraud
The increasingly pervasive problem of online auction fraud has
several common manifestations. The abuses arise during two
separate phases of the online auction process: during the bidding
process and after the bidding process has been completed.
During the bidding process, perpetrators can engage in "bid
shielding" and "shill bidding." Bid shielding refers to the collusion of
bidders to artificially inflate the bids during an auction. One coconspirator puts in a low bid and then another co-conspirator puts in
a bid high enough to discourage outside bidders from entering the
auction."4 Just before the auction closes, the high bid is withdrawn,
and the low bidder, by default, is the successful bidder.54 Modifications to the way online auction sites conduct their auctions have
decreased the potential for bid shielding. Bidders are typically not
permitted to withdraw their bids unless there is a typographical error,
the seller has significantly changed the terms of the offer, email
messages sent to the seller are returned as undeliverable, or the

See Fields, supra note 36; see also Deborah Kong, InternetAuction FraudIncreases;Buyers Learn
the Hard Way To Be Care@ w h o n2g S a d Mong T p B u t Sometimes 'There's A Happy Ending
Anywy, U.S.A. TODAY,
June 23,2000, at 3B (quoting Holly Anderson, a spokeswoman for
the National Consumer League).
'I'
See 200I Internet Fraud Statistics, at http: //~~~.fraud,org/iiiternet/200
1stab 10mnt.htni
(last visited Mar. 9,2002). This number is an increase from the $326 average for 2000. See
Fields, supra note 36; Sheryl Harris, Intmet Fraud: Let the Bidder Bmare, RAIN DF.AI,I:K,Aug.
17,2000, at 1B; NCL Warm Consumers, supra note 41.
'' SeeJohnJ. Krol1,SoFarCyberspaceis ReasonabbSaje, P I A ~ " E A I , I : R , J U ~19,
~ 1999,at 1C.
.?? Id,
''I

."' See Dennis Prince, L h q Tricks: Online Auction Scams, at http://www.auctionwatch.com/
ernaii/print. htrnI?ret~awdaily/features/dirtyrricks/i~~dex.
html (Aug. 16, 1999).
See Faerber, supra note 32.
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feedback rating of the seller deteriorates after the bidder's initial bid:j5
A second form of fraud arising during the bidding process is shill
bidding, whereby a party puts in one or more false bids, with no
intention of actually purchasing the item."j Typically, parties employ
different user names to make these fraudulent bids, bidding on either
their own or their co-conspirators' offered items." Shill bids are
made to drive up the price of the auctioned item or to generate some
other benefit to the seller.58 For example, on some online auction
sites, if a particular auction reaches a certain number of bids, the
auction will be specially promoted on the site."9
In fairness to the online auction sites, shill bidding can be difficult
to detect. Any individual can use multiple user names to participate
in online auctions, alone or in concert with other shill bidders.'"
Thus, a cursory examination of the list of bidders may not reveal
collusion. Tracing collusive bidding is time-consuming, involving
hours of sifting through and matching up myriad bidding histories

Ii5Id. (quoting Kevin Pursglove ofeBay). To further discourage bid shielding, as ofAugust
1, 2001, eBay began prohibiting bid retractions within the last twelve hours of an auction.
See Michelle Dennehy, eBay Updates Bid Retraction Rules, at http://www.auctionwatch.com/
email/print.html?ret=/awdaily/daily news/augOl/ 1-080101.html (Aug. 1, 2001); see also
eBay Help: Buyer Guide: Bid: Retracting a Bid, at http://www.pages.ebay.com/help/
buyerguide/bidding-retract.htm1(last visited Mar. 9, 2002); AmaZon.com: Help/Ordoingj?om
a n i r d Pa%/Auctions B <Shop.. ./Changing Your Bid, at http://www.amazon.com/exec/
obidos/tg/browse/-/537826/qid,=997805..
./ 103-36 15039-942141 (last visited Mar. 9,
2002).
'Ii See Internet Auction Fraud Report, supra note 1 1, at 4;see also Snyder, supra note 6, at 457;
Jonathan Rusch, n2e Rising E d e ofhternet Fraud 2-3, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/usamay2001-1.htm (last visited Mar. 9,2002).
According to Louis Richman, the financial editor of Consumer Reports, shill bidding and
misrepresentation occur frequently online; although ConsumerReportshas no statistics as of yet
regarding incidents of shill bidding and misrepresentation, the magazine is designing a
research project to study online auctions systematically. See Ihe Bidding Game, supra note 12;
see ah0 Kong, supra note 49.
" See Maria O'Daniel, Recognising Common Net Scams, NEW SIRAI'I'S T1MF.S (MALAYSIA),
Oct. 2, 2000, at 39.
See Jamie Beckett &Jon Swartz, Bidder Bmare, Say eBay Critics, S.F. C H K ~ NDec.
. , 22,
1998, at B1.
Auctions on eBay that reach the thirty-bid level fall within eBay's "hot" category and
earn a special promotion on the site. Id.
"' See The Bidding Game, supra note 12.

''
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and user feedback."' Because of cost considerations and storage
capacity issues, auction records may be expunged from an online
auction site after a set number of days. This may affect the viability
of any investigation into shill bidding or other forms of collusion, as
the bidding record retention period may not be long enough to allow
investigators to uncover shill bidders who spread out their fraudulent
bids."'
Even when a particular bidding history is still available, it typically
reveals only the highest offer entered by each user name, which may
mask the progress of bids."3 In addition, overlapping bids may not
necessarily signal collusion, as some overlap may be coincidental, if
not inevitable. Sometimes innocent bidding appears suspicious,
especially in narrow areas of collecting where it stands to reason that
there might be innocent overlap.'" Buyers and sellers interested in
one sort of item, such as abstract art, will gravitate to those offerings,
and sellers of those kinds of items may make multiple offerings in that
area. Also, some buyers simply may prefer to buy from a seller with
whom they have had a positive experience.6"
Nonetheless, experts say that online auction sites can and should
do more to prevent shill bidding."; Critics claim that online auction
sites are slow to take action on complaints about shill bidding."'
Arguably, online auction sites have a disincentive to eradicate shill

"I eBay uses proprietary software called "shill hunter" to check bidding histories for
collusion. See inza note 114.
eBay purges its rrcorcls every thirty days. See The Bzddzrg Game, supra note 12.
'I'
I"

'It

Id.
Id.
Id.

'" According to Professor Eric Greenleaf of the Stem School of Business at New York
University, "[t] here should be patterns that would he very suspicious. These companies have
powerful computing ability, and it would be easy to search for coincidences. But it's timeconsuming, and eBay is very laissez-faire." Id.
"',Ye# Reckett & Swartz, supra note 58. According to eBay:
The Investigations Team attempts to resolve reported c a w of inappropriate trading
behavior. eBay will consider the circunistances of an alleged offense and the user's
trading records before taking action.
Disciplinary action may range from a formal warning, up to indefinite suspension of
a user's account. However, if we cannot prove your complaint with certainty, we
make takr no action.
eBay He&: Communi9 Stundarh: InueslgateJ, at h t tp :/ /pages. ebay. com / help / commen ts /
investigates.htm1(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
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bidding, since tolerating shill bidding on their sites will drive up the
selling prices, and thus ultimately result in greater commissions for the
online auction sites because they receive some stated percentage of
each online auction transactions6*
After the bidding has closed, additional opportunities for fraud
emerge. 69 The first and most common scenario is simply a failure by
one party to perform. This typically occurs when a seller fails to
deliver the promised goods after the buyer has paid in full, constituting fraud in the f a ~ t u m . ~A
' less common form of this scenario
involves a successful bidder failing to complete the transaction by
failing to pay for an item the seller has delivered. The cost of this
form of fraud is evidenced by the seller having to undertake an
entirely new auction, with the potential, despite the lack ofculpability
on the part of the seller, for a cloud on the transaction as a result of
the existence of a second a ~ c t i o n . ~ '
A second form of online auction fraud that surfaces after the
bidding has closed involves material misrepresentations of the items
auctioned. The fraud occurs when a party is induced into a contract
by a material misrepresentation, constituting fraudulent inducement.72In this scenario, a buyer receives the item, but the item is not
as it had been described.73

68

eBay He&: CommuniQ Standards: Investzgates, supra note 67.

'' See Kong, supra note 49.

70 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. More than eighty percent of the
complaints the Federal Trade Commission receives stem from sellers' failure to deliver
purchased and paid-for items to buyers. See Kong, supra note 49; see also Snyder, supra note
6, at 458; Rusch, supra note 56, at 2; Saul Hansell &Judith H. Dobrzynski, eBay Cancels Art
Sale and Su$mds Seller, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1 1, 2000, at A1 ; Internet Auction Fraud Report, supra
note 11, at 7; Internet Fraud Watch Online Auction l i p s , at http://www.fraud.org/news/
1998/nov98/111698.htm (Nov. 16,1998).
" See Snyder, supra note 6, at 458-59.
72 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
73 Such activity can violate federal statutes prohibiting mail fraud, wire fraud and, if the
auctioned item was stolen, may constitutetransportation ofstolen property across state lines.
Fraud in online auctions is investigated as mail fraud, because the bidders send their money
through the U.S. mail. See Beckett & Swartz, supra note 58 (quoting postal worker Linda
Kirksey of Fort Worth, Texas). The violation of statutes prohibiting transportation across
state lines is relevant in the context of fraud only in the event that the seller's
misrepresentationwas as to seller's title to the goods in question. See Steven A. Hetcher, W e
SENI'INEI,,Dec. 5,2000,
Need ToAvoid Tmdency To Ovmegulate OnlineAuctiom, MILWAUKEEJ.
at 17A, see also Snyder, supra note 6, at 458; Hansell & Dobrzynski, supra note 70.
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Online auction fraud in its various forms is becoming a n increasingly pervasive problem due to the lack of meaningful consumer
protection in the form of appropriate regulation and enforcement
thereof, as well as the dearth ofconsumer education efforts. T h e high
number of complaints about online auction fraud illustrates the need
for steps to be taken to protect consumers from being victimized by
online auction fraud, and to provide meaningful relief in the event
that consumers are so victimized.

11. OXLINE AUCTIONW U D LAWSUITS
The increasing problem of online auction fraud is also evident in
the nation's judicial dockets. A major component of the current
governmental effort to curb online auction fraud is the prosecution of
the perpetrators. Because of the ephemeral nature of information on
the Internet, online fraud cases differ from traditional fraud cases, as
data can be purged or reworked in such a way as to hinder investigation into suspected Internet
fraud.'4 Thus, these cases must be
__
prosecuted differently.' Since 1994, the FTC has brought 200 such
actions against over 653 respondents or defendants, obtaining injunctions and ordering over 3 180 million in redress or di~gorgement.~"
Of
the 200 cases, only five involved online auction fraud.77 Other law

:t

O n e I~allrnarkofI~itrrnet
fraud is the ability ofperpetrators to cover their tracks and
mask their location arid idtntities. Iising anonymous e n d s , short-lived Web-sites,
and falsifieci dorriairi name registrations, many fraud operators are able to strike
quickly, victimize tliousands of comuniers iri a short period of time, and disappear
without a trace.
FrC Statement un Intmet Fraud, supra note 4, at 9; see aha T o m Wolverton Pr Greg Sandoval,
Net Crime Poses Chalhgt to Authon'ties, CNET N1:\+'s.co\l (Oct. 12, 1999), at
http://rirws.cnet.corri/riews/O- 1007-200-850601.htrul.
_.
" SFQ
Tracing in Internet Fraud Cues: PaiKain and NEI Webuiurltl, at
http: / / M.wW.uSdOj.Rovicriniinal/c~l~rrcrirrie/
uslurray2001-3.titm t.layt visited Mar. 9,2002);
J ~ C
aLu Rovella. supra note 36 (quoting Christopher Painter, deputy chief o f t h e Criminal
Divisioii's Computer Crimes and Intellrctual Property sectionj.
''' The FTC has collected ovtr $55 niillion in redress for ctriiirir fraud victims. See F71:
Stntvrwnnton Intmiet Fraud, Jupra note 4, ar 2-3, n.9; seealso CommissionEnfurcementArtions Inoohiq
thelntmrel and Online&ices), al ti ttp://u?n?\;.ftr.gov/bcp/iriteriict/cascs-iiiternet.pdf
(Oc,t. 1,
290 1 [liereinafter CurnmZSsiun Enfnrcmmnt ..lrtionr].
__
" Tlir remaining cases involved other form of Internet fraud, iiicluding Internet service
provider scams, pyramid schemes, and health care fraud. see Law Enfurcw ?arget 'Tab 10"
Online S a m ; Cormme7 Protection Cops Fmrn 9 Coiintn'es, 5 C.S. Agmries, And 23 States Tackle Intmet
Fraud. at fitcp://ww.ftc.gov/spa/2000/ l0/roptcn.htm iOct. 3 1, 2000) elereinafter Lzw
i
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enforcement agencies are prosecuting online auction fraud as well.
In late 1999, Robert Guest had the distinction of receiving the first
federal prison sentence resulting from online auction fraud.78
Two online auction fraud cases have garnered the lion’s share of
press. The first case is notable both for its timing and its impact on
how the FTC approaches online auction fraud, and the second case
is notable for its scope. Although the government was successful in
both cases, judicial action is not the most cost-effective approach to
dealing with online auction fraud. However, the facts of these two
cases illustrate the critical need for additional efforts to protect
consumers from being victimized by online auction fraud, and to
provide avenues for meaningful relief in the event that they are so
victimized.

A. The Hare Case
In its first action against an online auction seller, the FTC alleged
that Mr. Hare of Lake Worth, Florida, violated the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the Mail or Telephone Order Merchandise
Rule by offering computers and related equipment for sale via online

Enforcers Target Top 101. Four of the five FTC-prosecuted online auction fraud cases to date
involve failure to deliver computers to the successful bidder. See Federal Trade Commission v.
Auction Saner, LLC, Complaintfor Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, at http://www. ftc.gov/os/
2000/ 1O/auctionsavercomplaint.pdf (lastvisited Mar. 9,2002); Internet Auctioneer Settles F7C
Charges, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/08/computerbyus.htm(Aug. 30, 2001); Federal
Trade Commission u. Michael Dewhurst, Complaintfor Pmanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relig,
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ZOOO/ 1O/empireauctioncomplaint.htm (lastvisited Mar. 9,2002);
ComplaintforInjunction and Other EquitableRelief, at http:/ /ftc.gov.os/ 1998/9804/compl3.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2002) bereinafter Hare Complaint]; see also infra notes 78-82 and
accompanying text (discussingthe Hare case). The fifth online auction case is currently under
seal and thus no information is publicly available at this time. See Commission Enforcement
Actions, supra note 76, case number 165, at 66.
78 See Krebs, supra note 30. In late 1999, Robert Guest plead guilty to mail fraud and was
sentenced to fourteen months in prison and ordered to pay over $101,000 to his victims.
Mr. Guest netted $37,000 by auctioning non-existent goods, using the alias “Darren Jay
Farmer.” He created a reputable “seller’s history” for himself on eBay before he accepted
bids and payments for merchandise he never delivered. See Kristina Stefanova, Cyber Con
Men B ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , I N S I G H ? ’ ~ N T H EApr.
N E W17,2000,
S,
at 27; seealso Dennis Prince, Fraud’sSiher
Lining, at http://www.auctionwatch.com/awdaily/viewpoint/speakout/silverlining.html
(Aug. 16, 1999);Michelle Dennehy, eBy User in Fed Slammer, at http://www.auctionwatch.
com/email/print.html?ret=/awdaily/dailynews/novem..
./2- 1 10399.htm (Nov. 3, 1999);
Man Sentencedf o r eBay Fraud, CNET.COMNEWS (Nov. 2, 1999), at http://news.cnet.com/
news-1007-200- 1427746.htm1.
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auction sites, accepting payment and failing to deliver the goods.7‘’
He took as much as $1,450 from each successful bidder but never sent
the computers or refunded the money.”
Ultimately, Mr. Hare pled guilty to wire fraud.*’ He was sentenced
to six months home detention, three years probation and was ordered
to pay restitution of over $22,000.8‘ Furthermore, pursuant to a
request by the FI’C, Mr. Hare was banned from doing business on
the Internet.’“
The Hare case is notable for more than its distinction as the first
online auction fraud prosecution by the FTC. Although the FTC was
successful in Hare, the litigation prompted the FTC to develop a
comprehensive, three-pronged approach to fighting online auction
fraud in an effort to prevent online auction fraud before it occurs,
thus obviating the need to expend the financial and other resources
necessary for a successful prosecution.’4 The approach consisted of

’!’ See Hare Coniphint, .supra note 77; see also Internet ‘Enfreprenacr’Sentencedfor Wire Fraud, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 1999/9902/hare3.htm iTeb. 17, 1999) [hereinafter Entrepreneur
Sentence4. Mr. Hare stated in advertisements that he was marketing “Micron 266, MHZ
Prntium TI rnnipiitem with rnnnitnm,” “Toshilxt Satellite Pro 4 10 DCT” c~mputers,and
hard drives. See FTC Halts Internet duction House Scam, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
1998/9804/hare,htm I,.+-.
13, 19981 [hereinafter f f C Halts Scam];see also Internet Merchant
BanedforLfefrom YVet bnred”Commerce, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 1998/9809/auction.htm
(Sept. 8. 1998j.
I’‘
See f f C H a L l ~Scam, supra note 79.
RI
The FTC requested and was granted a temporary restraining order and a freeze on Mr.
Hare’s assets, pending trial. The FTC further referred the case to the FBI in West Palm
Beach, Florida, and the U.S. r\ttorney for the Southern District of Florida. See Entrepreneur
~~t’IltfYWd,
J 7 q T i I IlOle 79.
‘” Id.; see also Online Auction Fraud Ca.se.r. .nip70 note 33; Entrepreneur Sentenced, Supra note 79.
‘I.’ The Court issued a stipulated permanent injunction barmirig Mr. Hare from using the
Internet to “advertise, market or otheruise offer for sale a n y goods or services.” See Tom
I a w r v , On-line~litctimeereBayRaises t,VebSiteSm~n‘p,LJ.S..l. TODAY, FcL. 15, 1999, at 6B; see
000Goi7g Going, Gone, nrpm note 42, at 7. Before the stipulated final order, the Court issued
a ternprary restraining order w i t h the asset freeze. The Court then approved the parties’
stipulation to an extended, rriodified temporary restraining order. See F2-C Halts Scam, mpm
note 79; see also Entreprmeur Sentenced, supra note 79.
‘I&
Notwithstanding our important law enforcement activities, the Commission
recognizes that lawsuits alone cannot adequately protect consumen. Consumers must
hr r i r i p u w t ~ ~tod protect themselves in the new intcractivc world. .& such, the
Coniinission develops and encourages consumer education efforts and has prompted
industry to develop new technologies that afford consumen Iiiore control over their
trarnactioIis.
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training law enforcement personnel, tracking online auction fraud,
and educating consumers. First, with respect to training, investigators
would be taught to uncover and prosecute online fraud and would be
instructed on how to educate consumers about online fraud.85 Next,
with respect to tracking online auction fraud, the FTC would use its
“Consumer Sentinel” program to identie perpetrators and to refer
potential Internet fraud cases to the appropriate law enforcement
agencies, while undertaking certain prosecutions itself.86 Consumer
Sentinel is a web-based, binational, multi-state computerized
consumer fraud database that uses the Internet to provide secure
access to over 300,000 consumer complaints from over 300 law
enforcement organizations across the United States and Canada.87
Finally, with respect to consumer education, the FTC would work
with the online auction sites to encourage the sites’ adoption of
additional consumer protection measures, while the FTC continued
its own consumer education efforts.88
The FTC’s efforts to date are steps in the right direction, but
training, tracking, and consumer education are insufficient to control
the escalating problem of online auction fraud.89 The FTC, as the

Mozelle W. Thompson, Presentation: The Challenges ojTam in CyberspaceFostmng the Growth and
Snfeep ofE-Commerce, 6 B.U. J. ScI. &TECH.L. 1 , 3 (2000).
R5 See Goin., Going, Gone, supra note 42; see also Fields, supra note 36.
86 See G o i q Going, Gone, supra note 42, at 2. Complaints and inquiries come to Consumer
Sentinel through the FT’C’s Consumer Response Center at the rate of 12,000per week. See
FTC Statement on Internet Fraud, supra note 4, at 14.
87 See C o m e r Satinel, at http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/index.html
(lastvisited Mar.
9, 2002). In 1998, 8,000 Internet-related complaints were registered with Consumer
Sentinel. In 1999, the number of complaints rose to 18,600. See Internet Fraud- Worhng Group
On Unlawfil Conduct on the Internet B-1 app., at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/append.htm#B (last visited Mar. 9, 2002). In 2000, over 100,000
complaints were entered into Consumer Sentinel. See Consumer Sentinel: Fraud Trends, at
http://www.consurner.gov/sentinel/trends.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002); see also Boom in
E-Commerce Hm Created Fertile Gound for Fraud: FTC, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2001/05/iftestimony.htm (May 23, 2001).
** According to the FTC, meaningful consumer protection requires: “( 1)coordinated law
enforcement against fraud and deception; (2) private initiatives and public/private
partnerships and (3) consumer education through the combined efforts of government,
business, and consumer groups.” FTC Statement on Consumer Protection, mpra note 5, at 3; see
also Snyder, supra note 6, at 463.
89
FTC-initiated prosecutions are becoming increasingly common. With the favorable
results in Hare, it is clear that the FIX is capable of protecting consumers in some
sense. However, civil actions brought against individuals can only be so effective.
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federal government’s primary consumer protection agency, must use
its substantial regulatory authority to force the online auction sites to
take responsibility for fraud prevention in the only way the sites will
understand-by subjecting them to financial liability for fraud on
their sites.’*

B. T h e Walton Case
The other online auction fraud case to gain widespread attention
was the federal government’s prosecution of Mr. Kenneth Walton of
Sacramento, California. In what is believed to be the first criminal
case resulting from shill bidding online, and certainly one of the most
notorious ofsuch cases,‘” the federal government charged Mr. Walton
with wire fraud and mail fraud in connection with online auction
fraud.”2 Mr. Walton, with help from two co-defendants, put an abstract painting up for auction on eBay, trying to create the impression
that the work was painted by American modernist Richard

Rather than investigating every individual case of fraud, it would be much more
efficient and ultimately beneficial to the consumer if the FTC turned the focus of its
attention on the auction houses themselves. Making the auction houses responsible
for the fraudulent conduct would implore them to take all steps necessary to protect
the consumer.
Snyder, mpra note 6, at 464-65; see also Statement ofJodie Bmtein on InternetAuction Fraud, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/02/jodiestatement.htm(Feb. 14,2000); OnlineAuction Fraud
Cases, supra note 33.
See FTC Statnnenl on Intemct Fraud. supra note 4, at 1-2; see ako Snyder, supra note 6, at
464. The l T C has as its primary legislative mandate the enforcement of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. which prohibits “unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting conixnerce.”
See Federal Trade Cornmission . k t , 15 1J.S.C. 4 45(a) (1994).
“The Fedrral Trade Commission has interpreted its enabling legislation as allowing it
to regulate E-commercc arid it has interpreted its rules concerning things such as fair
marketing practices and mandatory disclosures as applying to the Intcmet.” I998 htemet
Fraud SkriU-fics, at http://www.fraud-org/intenret/9810stat.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002)
[hereinafter 1998 Fraud stat&ks]; see also infra notes 132-45 and accompanying text
idiscussing suggested areas for regulation!.
See Eric Young, Tuio M m Plead Guile in e B q Scam, I?i1)L:SI‘RY STANDARD, at
http: / /v.ww. thestandard.com/au/articles/artidcle_print10,1454,138 10,OO.html (Apr. 18,
2000) ion file with the author).
<’?
See Indictrnent at 1, United States v. Fetterman, Walton & Beach [hereinafter Walton
Indictment] (on file with the author\.
‘*I

$11
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Diebenkorn.”j The Walton case demonstrates the need for safeguards
in the online auction process-safeguards that can most easily be
instituted and financed by the online auction sites themselves. These
safeguards include mandatory consumer education efforts, identity
and credit-worthiness verification for all online auction participants,
low-cost or free escrow services, insurance for the full value of
transactions, and authentication of offered it ern^."^
From October 1998 through May 2000, the defendants devised
and participated in a scheme to defraud eBay users by engaging in a
bidding ring.g5 They created false aliases not traceable to their real
identities, provided fraudulent feedback on each other’s user names,
and placed fraudulent bids.g6 For some of their multiple user names,
they appropriated the last names of famous artists, to give the
impression that some family member of the famous artist was the
bidder. The total value of the winning bids in the auctions hosted by
the defendants, using shill bidding, exceeded $450,000.g7
Mr. Walton forged the initials “RD 52” on the bottom right corner
of the fraudulent Diebenkorn, adjacent to a hole in the painting, in an

93 Kenneth Fetterman and Scott Beach were charged along with Mr. Walton. Id. at 1,lO;
see also Mark E. Wojcik, Lawyers Mo Lie &-Line: How Should the Legal ADR
f TsD
i nRespond to e B q
Ethics?, 18J . MARSHALLJ.COMPUTER &INFO. L. 875,876 (2000).
g4 See inpa notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
See Walton Indictment, supra note 92, at 5.
Records from eBay and from e-mail service providers confirm that Fetterman and his
co-schemers shielded their true identities from eBay and its users by providing bogus
names, and postal addresses obtained from free email providers known to collect little
or no verifiable information on their account holders. By creating multiple User Ids,
Fetterman and his co-schemers intended to deceive other eBay users into believing
that the fraudulent or “shill” bids they placed on each other’s items were, in fact,
legitimate.
Compl. at 6, United States v. Fetterman, (Feb. 2, 2001) Ida Aff.,(Special Agent, Internal
Revenue Service, Criminal Investigations) (on file with author).
96 These fraudulent bids
constituted misrepresentations that [the defendants] were legitimate and independent
eBay users who intended, and were willing, to pay the amounts they bid on those
items. By making these misrepresentations, [the defendants] intended to defraud
other eBay usem by causing them to place significantlyhigher bids for the items than
they would have absent the fraudulent bids.
Walton Indictment, supa note 92, at 4;seealsoJohn Schwartz &Judith H. Dobrzynski, 3Men
are Charged with Fraud in I, 100 A?tAuctions on eBq, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9,2001, at A l ; Young,
supra note 9 1.
“ See WaIton Indictment, supra note 92, at 8.

‘’
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effort to defraud bidders into thinking the work was painted by the
renowned California artist.08 Mr. Walton included three digital
pictures of the painting, including a close up shot of a hole in the
bottom right corner near the forged initials.09 To foster the image
that he was unsophisticated in matters of art, Mr. Walton listed the
painting under his eBay user name "golfpoorly," which had little
history of trading in art.'"" His fellow defendants, under a variety of
user names, prolided positive feedback for "golfpoorly."'"' To
further the impression of his lack of sophistication, he included the
painting along with a deflated basketball, a Mexican voodoo mask,
and an unopened roll of twine.'"' He set the minimum bid on the
piece at 25 cents. In his written description of the painting, Mr.
Walton claimed that he bought the painting at a garage sale in
Berkeley, California, before he was married,'"? and that his child had
punctured a hole in it with his Big Wheel tricycle.'"
In reality, Mr. Walton had no wife, no child and thus (one assumes)
no Big Wheel. He purchased the unsigned abstract painting from a
secondhand store in Little Rock, California, not in Berkeley.'05 Mr.
Walton chose Berkeley as the alleged location of the painting to
promote the false impression that the painting came from the area
where Mr. Diebenkorn painted in the early 1950s.'"'' The tale of his
mythical child's tricycle accident was designed to draw the bidders'
eyes to the hole, adjacent to the forged initials.lo7 According to the
government, these statements were "misrepresentations designed to

'" Id. at 9.
"' See WaIton Complaint, supra note 95, at IO.

'"' See Kenneth Walton Plea Agreement at 16 (!lpr. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Waltori Plea
i\greernent] !on file with the author!.
Ill1
See Walton Indictment, supra note 92, at 9-10.
,,l?
&e Wdton Indictment, supra note 92, at 9; see nko Wdton Plea Agreement, supra note
100, at 17.
' w SteJudith H. Dobrzynski, Olrline S e k g.4bstrut Mbrk Adds Mong-Rack Guarantee, N.Y.
TfXiES, May 10, 2000, at A f ; see a h Jonathan Ciiriel et al., eBay Bihr Probed 4 y FBZ,S.F.
CHKON.,June 7, 2000, at .U.
1"1
See Walton Indictment, supra note 92. at 1O;seeako Harisell bz Dobrzynski, supm note 70.
"".' see Wdton Indictment, mpru note 92, at 8-9.
""j See Walton Complaint, supra note 95, at 1 1; see a h Waltori Indictment, m p u note 92,
at 10.
llii
See Walt011Complaint, m ~ r unote 95, at 1 1; see a h Walton Indictment, supra note 92,
a t In.
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deceive potential bidders into increasing their bids on Walton's
painting." lo8
Although Mr. Walton made no affirmative claims about the
identity of the artist, there was rampant speculation fueled by Mr.
Walton's story that the work was in fact by Diebenkorn.lo9The three
defendants' fraudulent bids on the painting drove the price up to
$135,805."0 When the press picked up the story, Mr. Walton said
that he would cancel the legally binding sale if experts determined
that the painting was not in fact painted by Diebenkorn, and if the
buyer, Rob Keereweer of the Netherlands, wanted to rescind the
sale.l 1 Mr. Walton denied faking the painting or adding the initials.
He acknowledged to Mr. Keereweer that he had "made up a little
story to go with the painting." The parties then decided to put off the
transaction temporarily.' I 2
After significant attention by the press, eBay cancelled the sale,
contending that Mr. Walton had engaged in shill bidding, and
suspended Mr. Walton's trading privileges, first for thirty days, and
then permanently.'13 Mr. Walton's painting drew ninety-five bids,
but according to the bid history compiled by eBay,'I4these bids were
I OH

See Walton Complaint, supra note 95, at 10.

'"' SeeDobrzynski,supra note 103; seealso 7heBidding Game, supra note 12;Wojcik, supra note
93, at 876-89.
' I " One bidder withdrew his bid after Walton would not let him inspect the painting in
person. See Dobrzynski, supra note 102; see also Walton Indictment, supra note 92, at 12;
Schwartz & Dobrzynski, supra note 96; The Bidding Game, supra note 12.
' ' I See Dobrzynski, supra note 103. However, just before the auction closed, Mr. Walton
added the following description of the painting:
This painting is sold in the same manner as the other items I am selling on eBay and
requires full payment within 7 days of the auction, in advance of delivery to the buyer,
and is sold as described in the auction description, without representation as to
authorship or authenticity.
Wojcik, supra note 93, at 886.
'I' See Dobrzynski, supra note 103.
' I 3 Mr. Walton's suspension from eBay "had nothing to do with the authenticity of the
painting or the story he invented to go with the work." H e was suspended for shill bidding.
See The B i d d i q Game, supra note 12.
' I 4 According to Kevin Pursglove of eBay:
Plecause approximately 6 million items are listed on eBay each day, it would be
impossible to catch each and every fraudulent action as it occurs. However, eBay's
new proprietary software tools gives the online auction leader the best possible chance
to do so, Pursglove said. The software searches the bidding history of individual
bidders to look for historical shill patterns, and identifies shill patterns as they are
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made by just seventeen user names,"" who turned out to be a total of
five indiGduals, including Mr. Walton and his two co-defendants,
using multiple user names.' It'
The very attention that Mr. Walton cultivated to drive up the price
of the painting ultimately brought him to the attention of law
enforcement. The FBI opened its investigation after reading a
newspaper article detailing Mr. Walton's claims about how he gained
possession ofthe painting."' In March 200 1, Mr. Walton, along with
Scott Beach and Kenneth Fetterman, was indicted on charges of
participating in a bidding ring that cost art buyers a total of
$450,000.' The thirty-five-page indictment charges the three with
sixteen separate counts of wire and mail fraud in connection with
1,100 auctions between October 1998 and May 2000, including the
auction of the purported Diebenkorn."" Each count carries a
maximum penalty of up to five years in prison and $1 million in
fines."('
Mr. Walton and Mr. Beach pled guilty on April 17,200 1, pursuant
to plea agreements with the federal government.12' Mr. Fetterman
remains at large, and his girlfriend has been charged with harboring
or concealing him.12' Under the terms of the plea agreements, both

occurring.
Michael Mahoney, eBcy Scam Artists Face Criminal Cliargm, E-COLILIEKCE TIMES (Mar. 9,
2001). at http://www.newsfactor.corn/perl/printer/8086(on file with the author).
' I i See The Bidding Game, mpm note 12.
1 11.8

Id,

' '' Id.; see also Wojcik, supra note 93, at 88F90.
''" See Schwartz & Dobrrynski, supra note 96.
I " ' The three men used over forty user names atid "buoyed prices and intended to trick
other bidden into believing that the sellrrs were respected users of eBay." Id.
1%

Id,

Mr. Walturi had to turn ovcr the fake Diebenkorn to the government, agree to a
summary disbarment from the California State Bar and agree to cooperate fully with the
government, in exchange for a recommenclation of leniency. See Walton Plea Agreement,
~ u p r onote 100, at 2-4.
I"' If convicted, Ms. Galipeaux faces up to five years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine.
See Warrant for .Arrest of T e n i Ann Galipeaux (on file with the author); see also Woman
Indicted For Harborirg Fw'tiiie in eBq ShiU Biddug Case Inoohirg Sale OfFake Debenkom Paintindor
8135,805, at 1, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/galipeaux_indict.htm (June
20, 200 1i.
'I
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Mr. Walton and Mr. Beach agreed not to participate, directly or
indirectly, in online auctions for a specified period.Iz3
The significant attention paid to the Wulton case by the media
illustrates how easy it is to commit fraud in an online auction, and
demonstrates the lack of consumer protection available for online
auction participants unless and until the government steps in to
prosecute the perpetrator. The government ultimately stopped Mr.
Walton and his co-defendants, but that same press attention may
have inspired other would-be Waltons to try their hand at online
auction fraud. In the absence of effective regulation of online
auctions and vigilant enforcement thereof, innocent victims have no
protection from online auction fraud and no avenue for relief in the
event they are so victimized.
Successful prosecution of any fraud case, including online auction
fraud cases, is useful in that it stops a particular defendant from
perpetrating a particular fraud for some particular period of time.
But an ex postfucto approach, focusing on prosecution instead of
prevention, misses the opportunity to halt fraud before it occurs. The
increasing numbers of online auction participants and online auction
fraud complaints make this missed opportunity even more
troublesome than in the context of traditional or ofline auctions.
The primary problem with the existing approaches to fighting online
auction fraud is that almost all of the prohibitions and consequences
focus on fraud that has already occurred. Efforts should be expended
in proactive prevention through consumer education, and through
the imposition of mandatory fraud prevention efforts on the online
auction sites, with financial liability for any failure to comply with the
requirements. These efforts would go a long way toward reducing
online auction fraud, with the costs borne by the parties who directly
benefit from the transactions: the online auction sites.

111. CURBING ONLINE AUCTIONFRAUD THROUGH
REGULATION,
ENFORCEMENT,
AND CONSUMER
EDUCATION
The high numbers of complaints about online auction fraud
highlight the absence of any meaningful consumer protection for
online auction participants. This dearth of consumer protection
stems from the lack of sufficient regulation of online auctions, the lack

''3

Walton Plea Agreement, supra note 100, at 6.
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of any meaningful enforcement of existing regulation, and the lack of
sufficient consumer education efforts with respect to online auction
fraud.
It is unrealistic, of course, to aim to wipe out online auction fraud
through the enactment of regulation alone. 12* Vigilant governmental
enforcement of such regulations and consumer education efforts are
necessary components of any successful effort to curb online auction
fraud. Thus, a better approach would be a comprehensive
governmental effort involving regulation of online auction sites,
enforcement efforts, and consumer education about the dangers of
online auctions.12' The online auction sites must be legally required
to take delineated steps to reduce online auction fraud, with the threat
of financial liability for any failure to do so.I2" Unless and until the
online auction sites are held financially responsible for fraud on their
sites, they have no real incentive to clean up fraud beyond the
minimum necessary to ensure a customer base using (and thus paying
for) their sites' services. Additionally, because of the low dollar
amount in the average online auction transaction, and the
enforcement costs associated with pursuing a fraud claim, defrauded
consumers and fraud investigators have a financial incentive not to
force the issue. Since the online auction sites are paid with a
percentage ofeach transaction and control the procedures in place on
their sites, they are in the best position to take steps to curb fraud and
to make defrauded consumers whole.

A. Regulating Online Auction Sites
The absence of regulation of online auction sites can be attributed
to several factors. Lawmakers may have been slow to react to the rise
in online auction fraud because of the rapid pace of technological
development and the scarcity of resources initially devoted to the
problem. The paucity of meaningful re<gulationof online auctions
may also be a function ofthe relative newness of the Internet as a

'''I

See Hetchcr, supra note 73.

'5Id,

"" ''Pertidties must be strong enough to act as real deterrents to fraud. Monetary penalties
should be substantial, and egregious or repeat ofTrrises should be treated as crimes." Id. at
5.
See Trmiis Rep&, supm nore 48, at 12; seedso Snyder, supra note 6, at 456; €%etcher,supra
not^ 73.

'"'
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significant medium of retail commerce. Lawmakers may be hesitant
to construct a regulatory scheme over a mode of commerce they do
not yet fully understand. Faced with other pressing demands,
lawmakers may take the position that the policy “caweat mptor”-let
the buyer beware-has worked for years, so why not let that be the
legislative solution with respect to online auction fraud?’‘8 This
position is evidenced by the application of existing laws designed for
a different jurisprudential landscape to a wide variety of Internet
crimes, albeit with varying degrees of success.129
To move beyond caveat emptor, lawmakers may feel they need to
enact significant new legislation tailored exclusively for the online
auction industry. Arguably, no significant new legislation is required,
as the fraudulent activity taking place online is already illegal; a party
making a material misrepresentation of a past or present material fact
with scienter and the intent to induce reliance, who in fact does
induce justifiable reliance, has committed fraud. I3O Moving a fraud

See Finn et al., supra note 29, at 350.
Rather than amending every traditional criminal statute to deal with the rapidly
growing industry of computer crimes, Congress, in 1984, enacted the Counterfeit Access
Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Law, 98 Stat. 1837,2190 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Q
1030). The law treated computer-related crimes as distinct federal offenses and was
narrowly drawn to prohibit a limited range of offenses, such as those involving classified
government information, and information of financial and consumer institutions.
Subsequently, as computer-related crime grew and new issues emerged, the volume of
federal and state legislation increased. In 1986, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was
enacted. That law was amended numerous times, including in 1996, with the National
Information Infrastructure Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3 1030.
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes have also been used to protect against
computer crime. 18 U.S.C. $$1341,1343. The statutes prohibit using interstate wire
communications or the mails to further a fraudulent scheme to obtain money or
property. Computer-aided theft involving the use of interstate wires or mails is
prohibited by the laws.
Zegas, supra note 16, at 24.
”” According to Commissioner Thompson of the FTC, “[wle are not in completely
uncharted territory, however. We already have in place a legal framework for consumer
protection and for choice of law and jurisdiction. Applying those principles to e-commerce
poses special challenges.” See Thompson, supra note 84, at 6; see also Wojcik, supra note 93,
at 894.
More U.S. Attorneys’ offces are pursuing significant Internet fraud cases. “The cases
being prosecuted tend to show that the criminal statutes that apply to other types of white
collar crime-conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, credit card fraud, securities fraud, money
laundering, and identity theft-are equally applicable to various forms of Internet fraud.”
Rusch, supra note 56, at 7.
12‘
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transaction to the online auction arena does not alter that result, but
it does add to the transaction an additional party, the online auction
site. The site controls the very introduction of the parties, and in fact,
enables the parties to accomplish the transaction, making it
appropriate to assign it some degree of responsibility for any fraud
occurring on its site. Modifications to the existing legal structure
through regulation can serve to bring the unique characteristics of
online auctions within the letter of the law by requiring the online
auction sites to take financial responsibility for any failure on their
part to take steps to reduce fraud on their sites."'
Appropriate regulation of the online auction industry requires
leveling the playing field. The most logical place to start is by holding
online 'auction sites financially liable for fraud occurring on their sites.
Because the online auction sites control the procedures in place on
their sites and take some percentage of each transaction, the online
auction sites are in a good position to prevent fraud and to indemnify
defrauded participants for their failure to do so. The online auction
sites should not be held to the status of absolute insurers for the
validity of transactions. Instead, a comprehensive regulatory scheme
superimposed on the online auction industry, setting out the specific
steps the online auction sites must follow to prevent fraud, is
needed. i2 Failure to adequately comply with these regulations

'

I ,I

Law enforcement agencies must have sufficient tools to protect consumers from
playing [ield in the rriarketplace. Law and
regulatioris that provide clear guidance for how legtimate rriarketing should be
conducted. prohibit abusive practices, and enablr agencies to prosecute violations
swiftly and effcctii~ly-,are important tools in the battle against fraud . . . . While
geiicral statutcs and re3qilatioiis concerning unfair or deceptivr acts or prac-tires
clearly apply to online rriarketing, legislative and regulatory borlira should consider
whether specific requirements, prohibitions arid penalties are needed in relation to
electronic-c-cirrirrierce.
. W I . &-,pod. suprrr riotr 17, at 5.
14.'
T l i c . tlilrrriina betwren fosterccit-iiar-krt,qowtli and governmcni rrior~itoringdoe~
riot
lesscn l!Ir Strong piihlic p l i c y inr
ts irivolved. C:nveri-mcrii has an interest in
cnsuririg the e-conirnerce confideiice reinforces e-commerce as a viable commercial
mrdiiirii, benefiting both e-busiiies3 arid e-consumers, Without government action,
c-coiisurnrrs niay adopt vigila~itisinto fight e-busincss abuses. Yet, govcrnmetil eowiiinerce actioii rriiist be caloulatrd a i d targrird, balaiicc market and soc:ial policics
in thr prcrc-esr, take rhc iritrrnet mccltaiiisrri into considrration a t i c l riot eliniinarr Pcc)~r~r~~erce's
attraction -c%cirricy, low c a t , exiily a
-iblecotiSiiIIier basr and the
Grridtaneous nature of busir!ess transartiorir.
Ilarrri and cnsiirr a fair and level
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should result in financial liability for the online auction sites.
The regulations should attempt to shine a light on online auctions,
removing the dark places where perpetrators of fraud lurk. First,
online auction sites should be required to educate consumers about
the potential for fraud in online auctions, including explanations of
the various forms of online auction fraud and the ways consumers can
protect themselves, or at least minimize their risks. These educational
messages should be required to be affirmatively acknowledged by
each user by clicking on a box prior to even viewing offered items on
an online auction site.134Furthermore, all online auction sites should
be required to provide direct links to both sites that educate
consumers about the possibility of online auction fraud and to sites
that accept reports of online auction fraud.’3‘

John R.Aguilar, Over the Rainbow European and Ammian Consumer Protection Policy and Remedy
ConJicts on the Intemet and a Possible Solution, 4 IiWI. J. COMM.L. & PoI.’Y 1, 10-1 1
(1999/2000).
I91
In order to handle the growing problem of online auction fraud definitively, the
FTC must come forth with a succinct legal framework to guide the industry in its
pursuit of fraud free transactions. The FTC should mandate certain procedures that
every online auction house must follow in order to escape the potential for being liable
if a fraudulent transaction occurs.
Snyder, supra note 6, at 47 1.
No matter what the FTC ultimately decides to do, one thing is clear. The final
guidelines must place liability upon the online auction house itself. The auction house
is clearly in the best position to oversee and police the entire auction community to
which it plays host. Rather than chasing the numerous fraudulant users and
continuing to strain the already thin law enforcement agencies, the most efficient and
effective method to end online auction fraud is to hold the hosts of the very place
where fraud occurs liable for the actions of its users. Once liability has attached, the
online auction houses will be quick to implement strict user policies in an effort to end
the very harm its Web site fosters.
Id. at 472.
‘ j 4 For example, the FTC offers tips on its website to help consumers when they “go
global.” See ETC Consumer Alert! Going Shopping? Go Global! A Guide f o r E-Consumers, at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/glblalrt.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002)
@ereinafter F7C Consumer Alert]. The Internet Fraud Watch Website provides “Online
Auction Tips” to help educate consumers. See Zntemet Fraud Watch, Online Auction T$s, at
http://www.fraud.org/internet/inttip/aucttip.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002). The
Department ofJustice also has tips for consumers on its website. See Internet Fraud, supra note
16, at 12.
135 These sites include the NFIC, at http://www.fraud.org/welmes.htm (last visited Mar.
9, 2002); the FTC, at http://www.ftc.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2002); and the IFCC, at
http://www.ifccfbi.gov/index.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ZFCq.
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The identities of all buyers and all sellers should be authenticated
at no cost to the parties. This simply should be a cost of doing
business for the online auction sites. Online auction sites receive a
percentage of the successful bid and should bear some responsibility
for cutting off this avenue for fraud. This identity validation can be
done through any reputable credit agency. "' Further, online auction
sites should strictly limit the number of user names any one person
can have. This may be an inconvenience to some innocent parties
who have legitimate reasons for multiple user names, but it also
decreases the potential for fraudulent participants to hide behind a
cloak of anonymity, which decrease may, in and of itself, increase
buyers' confidence in the online auction process.'37
The creditworthiness of both parties should be authenticated.
Therc are opportunities for fraud by both buyers who fail to pay and
sellers who fail to deliver. Online auction sites should require a valid
credit card with sufficient available credit to cover the value of the
goods offered for sale before any participant is permitted to offer to
sell or buy."* This adds a step to the auction transaction, but at
essentially no real cost to the participants. If participants cannot
provide this, arguably, their ability to honor their end of the transaction should be considered suspect.
All payments for auctions, in excess of some de minimis amount,
should be processed through escrow agents, either independent or inhouse at the online auction site, but in any event, free to the partici-

'

III,

See injka notes 191-94 and acronipaxiyirig text for a discussion of what online auction
sites are doing in this area.
I ii
Some ofthe suggested measures may ultirnately prove cost prohibitive for the online
auction rammiinity to impknient. If this is so, the spirit of thr suggested guidelines
c t i o r i l d prevail. Evcry participant shniild undenc&c dl or
ary procedures to eiisurc
the most complete information about ever)..other participant. Cooperation and
comniunication on every end will result in greater use ofonline auctions, an outcome
sure to please the online auction houses as well as the individual. Cooperation begets
currency.
Snydrt., w/mi note 6 , at 472.
I 'I' In late 1999, eBay began requiring its new sellers to provide a credit or debit card in
order to list an item for the first time on the site. Arcording to eBay, the increasing number
offraud rases brought to eBay's attention was one reason for the new requirement. See Andy
Roe, e&y Adds Credit Card Requirement, at http://www.auctionwatch.corn/email/print.
litml?rrt=/awdaily~Ic.wl;/octob.. .4-!02299.htm (Ckt. 22,I(J%i!-f) (on file with allthor).
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pants. The escrow agent will hold the buyer’s funds until the
purchased item arrives, in the promised ~ o n d i t i o n . ’ ~ ~
Online auction participants should be allowed to purchase
insurance to cover the full amount of their transactions. The online
auction sites can outsource this obligation or provide the insurance
themselves, in any case for the full value of the transaction, at some
reasonable price.’40
The existence and quality of the merchandise offered for sale
should be represented to, or evaluated by, the buyer as a condition of
being offered for sale on the auction site. For items valued above
some stated amount, an appraisal from a licensed expert should be
provided to the buyer, who can ascertain the validity of the appraisal.
In the alternative, sellers should be required to permit inspection of
the goods by the buyer or buyer’s representative prior to the start of
any auction.‘*’
The online auction sites should be required to maintain accurate
records of the complete bidding histories of their transactions for
some stated period of time sufficient to permit third-party inspection
of suspected fraud. The online auction sites’ cost and storage capacity
issues should be subordinated to the best interests of their participant~.’~~
Any failure to enforce these requirements should result in financial
penalties to the online auction site involved, with assistance from all
necessary law enforcement per~onne1.l~~
These penalties must be
substantial enough to operate as an incentive for the online auction
sites to deter fraud, and repeat offenses should be treated as crimes.’44
Online auction sites can then use their significant resources to seek
restitution from the perpetrator. Online auction sites may increase
the percentages of the transactions they charge to offset some of these
costs, and so the participants may wind up paying for these benefits
themselves. But appropriate consumer protection and opportunities
13’ See inza notes 195-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of what online auction
sites are doing in this area.
I4O See Finn et al., supra note 29, at 372; see also i n j a notes 201-05 and accompanying text
(discussing what online auction sites are doing in this area).
141
See Snyder, supra note 6, at 47 1; see also inza notes 206-09 and accompanying text
(discussing of what online auction sites are doing in this area),
See Finn et al., supra note 29, at 372; see also supra notes 61-62.
143
See Snyder, supra note 6, at 47 1.
See JVCL Repofi, supra note 17, at 5.
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for meaningful relief will increase consumer confidence in the online
auction process, leading to increases in the numbers of auctions, with
a greatly diminished threat of fraud.""

R. Ejiorts to Combat Online Azdction Fraud by Consumer Croups
As publicity surrounding the prevalence of online auction fraud
increases, in the absence of any meaningful protections undertaken
by the online auction sites themselves, either of a voluntary or
mandatory nature, new approaches for fighting fraud are being
developed by consumer groups through consumer education
efforts.'"' Some of the consumer groups include the National
Consumers League (NCL),lt7the National Fraud Information Center
(NF1C),I4*Internet Fraud Watch (IFW),'") and Better Business
Bureau Online. lx'

'

li

''G

See Finn et al., suprci note 29?at 2.

SeeXCL Report, supra note 17. at 3.

' l i "The National Consumers League. founded in 1899, is America's pioneer consumer
organization. Our mission is to identify-.protect. represent, and advance the economic and
social interests of consumern and workers. NCL is a private, nonprofit membership
organization." KCL W'nrns Conmrners, supra note 41, at 2. The NCL supports regulation to
provide additional guidance for sellers. better tools for law enforcement agencies, and more
effective penalties for perpetrators of Internet fraud. See XCL Report, supra note 17, at 5.
Additionally, the NCL recommends pernianent federal funding to train law enforcement in
fraud investigation, prosecution, and to support non-profit organizations that collect and
furnish data on online fraud to appropriate law enforcement agencies. Id.
'"' The NCL created the NFIC in 1992. The NHC offers online services and a toll-free
hotline for consumen to get advice about reporting suspected online fraud to law
enforcement agencies. SteAbout theh&mal Fraud Infomation Center, at http:/ /www.fraud.org/
aboutnfichtm ilast visited Mar. 9,20021; see also Joel Dresang, Buyers M7arnedA$er Complaints
Jan. 29, 1999. at 2: Weise, sup70 note 44; 2998NCL
About eBy?M~~,\I')\CKI<LJ.SL~I.ISI:I.,
Ithm Consumers, nqrn note 4.
' K ' The NCL created the Internet Fraud Watch as a companion prograni to the NFIC in
1996. SpeNCL Report, supra note 17, at 2; see also 1998 Infernet Fraud Statistics, sup70 note 90;
SUpm 39- 44 and accompanying text.
li"
Better Business Bureau Online is a u-holly owned subsidiary of the Council of Better
Business Bureaus; its niission is to "promote trust and confidence in the Internet by
encouraging sound arid ethical online business practices and by providing information to
ensure better educated online consumers." See http://www.bbbonline.org/consumer/
how.asp 1:last visited Mar. 9,2002); see also Lucille hf. Ponte, Throwing Good M o n q A j m Bad:
Can OnlineDispute Resolution (ODR)Really Deliiw the Goods-fir the Lhhappy Intmnet Shopper?, 3 TUl>.
. PKOIJ.5, 5.5, 56 n.2 1,2001;i.
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Consumer education is a critical component of any successful plan
to eliminate online auction fraud.I5’ If consumer confidence in the
Internet is diminished by the specter of fraud, the growth of ecommerce will likely decrease as well.’” While the services, programs, and information provided by these consumer groups have
merit, they in no way require the online auction sites to conform their
conduct to protect consumers. Thus, a need remains for a regulatory
framework of consumer protection with effective avenues for relief.”:’
Online auction sites can simply opt out of any voluntary program,
and their non-binding pledges to adhere, even to articulated standards, in the absence of meaningful financial sanctions for lapses,
would be just that-non-binding. In the absence of financial liability
for the online auction sites, the sites have little, if any, incentive to
take steps toward the eradication of online auction fraud.

C. Laze, Enforcement E$corts to Combat Online Auction Fraud
Law enforcement authorities have become increasingly aware of
the problems of online auction fraud.’j4 Many law enforcement

”’

According to the FTC:
Law enforcement alone cannot stop the tide of fraudulent activity on the Internet.
Meaningful consumer protection depends on education as well. Consumers must be
given the tools they need to spot potentially fraudulent promotions, and businesses
must be advised about how to comply with the law. The FTC’s consumer and
business education program uses the Internet to communicate anti-fraud and
educational messages to reach vast numbers of people in creative and novel ways
quickly, simply and at low cost. As more consumers and businesses come online, use
of the Internet to disseminate information will grow.
FTC Statement on Internet Fraud, supra note 4,at 11-12.
See Hetcher, supra note 73, at 3.
153
[El-businesses argue that self-regulation is the only effective means to ensure ecommerce protection, arguing that those who “establish and use online systems” are
best able to protect e-consumers and enforce their own rules. Yet, many doubt
whether any e-commerce would limit self-interested actions or have the ability to
regulate foreign or domestic deceptive trade practices. Relying upon market forces,
e-commerce fraud is highly resistant to self-regulation and allows perpetrators to harm
e-consumers even with content-filter mechanisms and non-governmental information
campaigns. Voluntary self-regulation only would bind those who abide by such
measures, for perpetrators have n o interest in protecting e-consumer interests-thus
necessitating governmental intervention.
Aguilar, supra note 132, at 10.
Congress seems to be taking an interest in online auction fraud:
As Congress continues to examine ways to protect consumers online and combat
cyber-scams, House Energy and Commerce Chairman Billy Tauzin (R-LA4)and
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agencies are undertaking efforts to educate online auction participants
on avoiding and reporting fraud.”’ These agencies are pooling their
resources to coordinate efforts to find and prosecute the perpetrators.
These agencies include various state governments,]j6the Securities
and Exchange Commission,’” the U S . Attorney’s Oflice,1’8 and
various combinations of law enforcement groups working together to
launch initiatives aimed at ferreting out Internet fraud. ‘30

Committee Member Rep. Heather Wilson /R-NM) have written several leading ecommerce companies seeking details on marketplace efforts to curb online auction
fraud, specifically “shilling” (the practice of driving up bidding prices on behalf of the
seller i.
Tauzin, W%on Nbnt Details on Shilling nnd Online Auction Fraud, at http://energycommerce.
house.gov/ 107/news/06262001-304print.htm (June 26, 2001). The letter requests
information, among other things, concerning the types of fraudulent activities occurring on
online auctions; the effect of the method of payment on the occurrence of fraud; the
incidence of shill bidding; the effect of concealing seller and buyer identities; and the
usefulness of feedback. Id.
‘‘l’ SeeJVCL Rep&, supra note 17, at 7.
li’’ For example, the Texas Internet Bureau focuses on online consumer fraud, online child
pornography, romputer hacking, and other crimes. See Tom Fowler, State Forms Crime Team
For Internet; Huge Increases Expected in Online Consumer Fraud, Ho~.’woN CHRON.,Sept. 22,
2000, at 1.
lii
The enforcement efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)with respect
to online fraud involve approximately 2,000 lawyers, accountants, and analysts who examine
eleven categories of fraud; the agency declined to describe these categories for fear that any
definition of the categories, and details about the SEC’s efforts, might prove counterproductive, hampering the agency’s efforts by better informing the perpetrators. See Ellen
L. Rosen, S a r y Inriestors Seek Out SECto S@ Internet Fraud, NAT’I.L.J., Feb. 14, 2000, at B5.
lit’
The U.S. Attorney’s office has a Criminal Division’s Computer Crimes and Intellectual
Property Section made up of twenty lawyers in Washington, D.C. who will assist the
computer and telecommunications coordinators in each U.S. Attorney’s office. See Rovella,
supra note 36
The Department ofJustice’s computer crimes section started out as part ofthe General
Litigation section in 199 1; it was given full-fledged status in 1996, but with only five lawyers.
Concurrently, the DOJ department created a network of federal prosecutors in each local
ofice to prosecute local computer crimes, to stay up-to-date with the developing Internet
law, and to serve as a clearing house for their co-workers. Id.
’..’!’ In February 2000, law enforcement and consiimer protection agencies from twentyseven countries took part in “Internet Surf,” a covert interagency program aimed at
uncovering Internet fraud. The effort involved 150 international organizations, including
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the ETC, the SEC, the Postal
Inspection Service and the DOJ. The CFTC examined about 300 Web sites that promote
a variety ofinvestment schemes involving commodity futures and options and promise quick
profits with little or no risk, and identified others for further investigation. See CFTC Takes
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The Department ofJustice (DOJ)and the FTC have taken the lead
among law enforcement entities in the fight against online fraud
through consumer education.‘“ The DOJ, cognizant of the global
nature of the Internet, participated in two programs to foster national
coordination and cooperation among various law enforcement
agencies. In February 1999, the DOJ established the Internet Fraud
Initiative (IFI),a national initiative intended to provide a comprehensive approach to combating Internet fraud.I6’ The goals of the IF1
are to ascertain the nature and scope of the online fraud problem,
develop appropriate training for law enforcement officials, foster the
development of investigative and analytical resources to identifjr and
investigate online fraud, provide and facilitate coordination among
various law enforcement groups, support and advise on Internet fraud
prosecutions nationwide, and establish a program ofpublic education
and prevention.I6*
These goals are a good template for any effort to curb online
auction fraud. Yet, without involving the online auction sites
themselves and holding them financially liable for the fraud on their
sites, these efforts will never succeed in doing more than closing the

Part In ‘InternetS u f To Root Out Fraud, See. Ll‘rIc.&RE(:. REP., Apr. 19,2000, at 3. The
FTC, which investigates fraud claims based on deceptive trade practices, said it had received
information on 1,600 Web sites from various national and international agencies. Id.; seeako
Rovella, supra note 36; Law Enforcers Target Internet Auction Fraud, supra note 37; Law Enforcers
Taarget Top 10, supra note 77.
“The FTC is the leader in both fighting fraud on the Internet and in using high-tech
tools to detect and deter fraud and to educate consumers about online scams.” Before the
Subcomm. on Commerc4 Trade and Consumer Protection ofthe Home Enmgy and Commerce Comm.,
107th Cong. 2 (2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OOl/l l/murisOlll07.htm (last visited
Mar. 9,2002) (testimony ofTimothyJ. Muris, Chairman ofthe Federal Trade Commission).
Recognizing that law enforcement alone cannot stem the tide of Internet auction
fraud, the FTC has launched an ambitious education program directed at Internet
auctions sites as well as auction participants. Most major and many smaller Internet
auction websites have fraud prevention and detection programs, and many are
working closely with law enforcement investigators when problem sellers are
identified. In fact, starting in February, eBay-perhaps the largest and best-known
of all Internet auction sites-will feed its fraud complaints directly to the WC]
Consumer Sentinel data base.
Goirg Going,Gone, supra note 42, at 2.
I b ‘ Internet Fraud, supra note 16, at 6.
I b 2 Id. at 9-10,

””

6 12 / Vol. 39 / American Business LawJounal
proverbial barn door after the online auction fraud horse. Proactive
prevention is necessary and must involve the online auction sites.
The second major effort by the DOJ is the Internet Fraud
Complaint Center (IFCC), established in May 2000, in cooperation
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National White
Collar Crime Center, a national support network funded by the
DOJ."" The IFCC also utilizes agents and analysts from the Internal
Revenue Service and the U S . Postal Inspection
The IFCC's primary mission is to address Internet fraud by
facilitating the flow of information behveen law enforcement agencies
and Internet fraud victims."" The IFCC's key functions for federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies are to receive online
complaints, analyze such complaints to identify particular schemes
and general crime trends in Internet fraud, compile and refer
potential Internet fraud schemes to law enforcement, and propose
strategies for dealing with Internet criminals.""' As of November 3,
2000, the IFCC web site had received more than 37.5 million visits
and 19,490 complaints.'"' The efforts of the IFCC are helpful but
ultimately insufficient, as they deal only with online auction fraud that

I"'

The mission of the IFCC is:
mo addres5 fraud committed over the Internet. For victirris of Internet fraud, IFCC
provides a convenierit and cay-to-use reporting mechanism that alerts authorities of

a suspected criminal or civil violation. For law enforcement and regulatory agencies
at all levels. IFCC offers a central repositor). for complaints related to Internet fraud,
works to quantify fraud patterns. and proiides timely statistical data of current fraud
trends.
IFCC, supra now 135: see Michael J . Snifferr. Cor,miment Lt,>bSite Encourn;ges Reporting oflnternet
Fraud, LIX;AI.
I > ' ~ : I . ~ . ~ ( ; F . s c ~ RMa>,
,
9. 2000. at 4.
' See Other IFCC P~T&Ts,at h t tp:/ /\%wTv,ifccfbi.gov/aboutus/ partners.asp (last visited Mar.
9.2002.
"'.' See Trmds Report, .mpm note 48: at 3: see also Corisunier Injormation, at http://www.
usdoj.gov/ci\iI/ocl/con_info.lrtm%lastvisited Mar. 9,200Li; NmSReportRecreak fatest Intenzet
Fraud 'Trmds. Statirtics. and Holbeds. at http://u~Yw.nw3c.org/sixmonth_trendsreport.ht~i
Mar. 6. 200 1 ,.
See Internet Fraud, sufira note 16, at 10: see also Sriiffen, supra note 163.
''.'See Trends Report, m , h note 48, at 3; see also Fowler, supra note 156;Auctions Top List ofNet
F m u d , C . S . . ~ . T o l ) : Sept.
~ ~ . 3,'LOOO.atDl;JudithH. Dobrz).nski,E-biddingProbed:FBIOp~
bwestigation AJer Reports OfConspirag to Rim Cp Bids on e B y Site, GAZI?ITL (MOYI'REAL),
June
T. 2000. at D2; Statistics. nt h t t p : / / w ~ ~ . i f c c f i g o v / s t r a t e ~ / s t a t i s t i ~ s .(last
a s pvisited Mar. 9,
''I

1

''I'
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has already happened, and do nothing to prevent online auction
fraud.
The FTC raised concerns about the proliferation of fraud on the
Internet and potential consumer protection problems resulting
therefrom long before e-commerce boomed.168As early as 1995, the
FTC held public hearings to examine potential issues arising from
technological innovations.’@‘ The FTC’s focus, then and now, has
been on maintaining consumer confidence in the Internet.17”
The FTC is involved in a comprehensive consumer and business
education eff01-t.’~~
Aspart of that effort, the FTC issued a Consumer
Alert called “Going Shopping? Go Global! A Guide for e-Consumers” in March 2000, notifying prospective online consumers about the
increasing incidence of online fraud, and offering tips for consumers
who elect to participate in online commerce.172Since the issuance of
this Alert, potential auction participants and online auction sites have
become more aware of the increasing incidence of online auction
fraud.’73But the FTC has had only limited success in policing the
online auctions, and, to date, the online auction sites have had no

SeeETCStatement on Internet Fraud, supra note 4, at 13.
See FTCStatemat on Consumer Protection, supra note 5, at 3; see aLso FTCStatement on Internet
Fraud, supra note 4, at 2.
I i o The FTC believes “it is important to address Internet fraud now, before it discourages
lbY

new consumen from going online and chokes off the impressive commercial growth now in
progress and potential innovation on the Internet.” FTCStatement onIntemet Fraud, supra note
4, at 2; see aLro Snyder, supra note 6, at 463.
17’ According to the FTC,
More than 200 of the consumer and business publications produced by the FTC’s
Bureau of Consumer Protection are available on the agency’s Website in both text
and .pdf format. Indeed, the growth in the number of our publications viewed online
between 1996 and 1999 (140,000 vs. 2.5 million) tells the story of the Internet’s
coming of age as a mainstream medium and highlights the importance to any largescale dissemination effort. Those 2.5 million page views are in addition to the 6
million print publications the FTC distributes each year to organizations that
disseminate them on the FTC’s behalf.
FTCStatmnent on Internet Fraud, supra note 4,at 1 1-1 2.
”? FTC tips to help consumers when they “go global” include: (1) know who you’re
dealing with; (2) know what you’re buying; (3) understand the terms, conditions, and costs
involved in the sale; (4) protect yourself when paying online; (5) look out for your privacy;
(6)understand what recourse you have if you run into problems with your purchase; (7) get
smart about e-commerce. Demand consumer-friendly policies and procedures. See FTC
ConsumerAlert,supra note 134.
See Snyder, supra note 6, at 454.
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financial accountability for such fraud. In the absence of regulation
requiring online auction sites to take financial responsibility for fraud
on their sites, the FTC’s only viable approach involves trying to
prevent online auction fraud through consumer education efforts, and
also stepping in after the fact, through prosecutions like Hare that
hopefully will serve as a model for future online auction fraud
prosecutions by the states.

Iv. ONLINE AUCTIONSITE RESPONSES TO ONLINE FRATJD
Although the incidence of online auction fraud is rising, most of the
public is not fully informed about the risks of Internet fraud.’74The
online auction sites are aware of the increasing problem of online
fraud, as they have been victimized by some hoaxes that have very
publicly illustrated the potential for fraud on these sites.’75 Yet the
online auction sites decry the need for regulation, pointing to the selfpolicing mechanisms they undertake with, arguably, varying degrees
of enthusiasm and even more vaned r e ~ u 1 t s . lThe
~ ~ online auction

lil

See X L Report, supra note 15. at 4.
eBay had aver): public example of the effects of the lack of regulation in bidding when
in December, 1998, eBay asked Katie Couric of the “Today” show to auction off a jacket
for charity after she and her ro-workers signed it. Bids climbed to $200,000,and then eBay
learned, much to its embarrassment, that most ofthe bids were pranks. The high bid among
legitimate bidders was $1 1,400. See Beckett & Swartz, supra note 58. After this public
embarrassment, ?Bay began increasing its security measures. See Streitfeld, supra note 22.
eBay claims the increases in security were not in response to the “Today” show mishap and
had been planned for months. SeeJon Swartz, e B v 7ighteru SecuriQ to FightAgaiwt Fraud, S.F.
CHRON.,Jan. 16, 1999, at D1.
Items p o s t d for sale on online auctions have purportedly included a guided missile,
human body parts, a teenager’s virginity. and votes in the 2000 presidential election, for
which the bidding went as high as $lO,lOO. Rumored auctions of human babies for a high
bid of $109,100 and a human kidney for a high bid of $5.7 million have proved to be hoaxes,
but in the absence of appropriate regulation. auctions of items like this may not bc impossible
to imagine. See B c N
,supra note 22, at 139: see also David Lazarus, eBy’s Winning Bid,
S.F. C H R O ~.4ug.
. , 3 1,2000, at C; 1 ; Steve Rubenstein, e B y Auction of Rare Stamp Probab$ an
Internet Hoax, S.F. CHRON.,Sept. 29, 1999, at h16;Jathon Sapsford, Sumy Sgys Online Fraud
is Increasing as More Merchants Take Steps to Fight it, WALL ST. ,I., at
http:/ /www.interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB973‘2
1 100754533573.htm (Nov. 3, 2000) (on
file with author); Shoe T&: eBny Pullsiluction aJCser’sUnborn Baby, CNEI’NE~\’S.COTV~
(Sept.
7, 19991,at http://news.cnet.~orn/news/O- 1007-200-346836.html?tag=rltdnws.
Online trading communities face some unique challenges. Among them are
finding creative cost effective means to protect users engaged in smaller transactions,
providing convenient access to ronventiotial forms of protection for users engagcd in

‘“

171,
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sites are reluctant to undertake the financial costs of additional fraud
prevention efforts, even as the numbers of reported online auction
fraud cases continue to rise, casting doubt on the effectivenessof any
particular measure or even the effectiveness of all such self-policing
measures in the aggregate.’77 But because the number of online
auction participants continues to rise, the dilemma of how to provide
greater security to online auction participants without incurring
greater operating costs has been resolved by the online auction sites
firmly in their favor.’78
The online auction sites affirmatively and explicitly disclaim any
responsibility for the risk of fraud on their sites, yet they oppose
regulation, leaving the cost of fraud squarely on the victim^.'^^ In

larger transactions, and developing effective means of dispute resolution. eBay has
instituted three programs to address these concerns. . . . These innovative programs
make it possible for eBay’s users to more easily protect themselves against fraud, and
resolve general disputes about products and services in a cost-effective manner.
eBay’s Response to the l T C , supra note 28, at 5.
The creative array of consumer education and protection programs that eBay has
developed respond to the challenges ofthe electronic marketplace. eBay is committed
to improving its consumer education and protection programs to deal with new or
unexpected consumer complaints. In the fast paced world of cyberspace, online firms
such as eBay are better positioned to address consumer fraud, deception and misuse
complaints than government regulatory agencies. eBay’s recent efforts to enhance its
consumer education and protection programs have been praised by a leading
consumer group as an “innovative step to reduce the potential for problems with
online auctions.” Moreover, eBay has implemented those enhancements quickly and
at minimal cost to its users.
Id. at 8.
See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
178 eBay claims to realize the importance of consumer confidence in theonline
auction process. The most significant challenge that eBay has faced is improving its
consumer protection programs to keep pace with the ingenuity of a small group who
attempt to abuse the auction process. O n its own initiative, eBay has instituted some
of the most innovative and consumer friendly programs in the industry to protect its
users from fraud, deception and misuse. eBay believes that its consumer education
and protection programs are a model for other online person-to-person sites and other
forms of e-commerce.
eBay’s Response to theFTC, supra note 28, at 1; see aLso Finn et al., supra note 29, at 5.
17‘ While the language of eBay’s lengthy User Agreement bears this out, the validity of
such a broad disclaimer has been raised in California. See Don Bauder, By& $ B o p Spolts
Items File Lawsuits Here Against eBay, SANDIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Apr. 2 1,2000, at C- 1. eBay
has since amended its User Agreement to require California residents to waive California
Civil Code Section 1542,whichprovides: “A general release does not extend to claims which
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response to questions about the increase in online auction fraud,
online auction sites first claim that the problem of fraud on their
auction sites is overstated because fraud, as a mathematical matter,
occurs in only a “tiny fiaction” of their sales.’’O Despite the technical
validity of this mathematical argument, the actual numbers themselves are quite high, and the mathematical argument is likely of little
comfort to online auction fraud victims.’8’

the creditor does riot know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time ofexecuting the release,
which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor.” CAI..
GI\’. Co1)t: 3 1342 IlYcst 2001 see also e B g CserAgremient.supra note 34,E 3.3; Lowry, supra
note 83.
1 I<,
Of the 1 .?I million online auction transactions conipleted each day, less than one
percent result in reported fraud. ”Percentage wise. Internet auction fraud is not as big a
problem as it first appeared because it is based on sheer volume. However, this sheervolume
still results in several thousand fraudulent transactions a year.” Internet Auction Frniid Report,
supra note 1 1. at 13.
?Bay offcials claim problems with fraud are extremely rare. with only one-tenth ofone
percent of its auctions involving fraud. See Swartz, supra note 175. That percentage may
sound quite small. but since in the first quarter of 2000, eBay held 53.6 million auctions
during which $1.15 billion worth of goods were sold, the implication is that almost 50,000
eBay auctions irlvolved fraud during that quarter alone. Id.
This nurnber doesn’t seem to trouble eBay. .According to eBay’s Associate General
Counsel. Robert Chestnut, “You can look at it and say there were 50,000cases offraud but
there are a lot of companies that would love to have only one-tenth of 1 percent of their
customers have a problem.” See Hansell & Dobrzynski. supra note 70, at C-2. This “tiny
fraction“ of fraud complaints made to the site does not include the incidences of fraud that
are reportedelsewhere than to the online auction site itself, OF incidents that are not reported
at all. See Hendren. supra note 12.
/!(I
.kcording to eBa).‘s vice president Steve IVestly: “Because we know the incidence of
fraud is quite low, we‘re happy to stand behind the community on this. There’s zero tolerSTAK,
ance for fraud on the site.’’ Robert Cribb. In!metAurtionePr Fkhting Fraud, TOROYIX)
Jan. 21. 1999, at D-1; seenlso Carlton &Tam. nqra note 14 (quoting Rob Chestnut, eBay’s
:\ssociate General Counsel in charge of fraiid~:Hansell & Dobrzynski, su~mnote 70. Fifty
thousand online auction participants might ciisagree. See Audri Lanford &Jim Lanford,
OiilinrrZuctionx Deal or Steal? at http://u~cu..scanil~usters.com/Scanibusters43.litm(Mar. 29,
1:

I

2001 .
Cornnientators compare the burgeoning problem of fraud on online auctions with the
problenis associated with the pay-per-call technology using 900 numbers:
The same attributes that made pay-per-call services so attractive to fraudulent userslow start up costs and the potential for big profit-exist on the Internet today. The
FTC and the FCC permitted the 900-number industry to attempt self-regulation and
only upon its failure did strict regulations become necessary.
Snyder, supra note 6. at 465.
Ifthe Internet is to avoid a fate similar to that of :lie 900-number industry, namely a
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The online auction sites themselves should take small comfort in
this mathematical defense. Many of the online auction sites are
publicly traded, so even though the actual number of reported fraud
cases may seem reasonable in the context of the overall number of
transactions, the public relations problems from a perception that an
online auction site is a magnet for fraud could be devastating. If the
perceived threat of fraud is too great, the users might elect not to
participate. If users elect not to participate, the online auction sites
will not earn commissions. Thus online auction sites have a financial
incentive to make sure that fraud does not rise to that level, and so the
sites will do the minimum necessary to keep users participating at a
financially viable level to protect their profit margins.’83 Any
additional efforts on the part of the online auction sites will need to be
financed by the sites from the revenue they earn from transactions on
their sites, an option that is less than appealing to the online auction
sites.

’”

marked decrease in consumer confidence and participation, the FTC must address
Internet fraud now. Self-regulation, whether of the 900-number industry or of the
online auction industry, will not be effective in preventing fraudulent users from
abusing the consumer.
Id. at 471.
In its lengthy user agreement, eBay makes it clear it does not vouch for the
authenticity of any transaction. But as a publicly traded corporation with a n
astronomical market value of $19 billion, it needs a good reputation-and as much
new business as possible. The safer it is, the more likely to have both.
Streitfeld, supra note 22.
eBay does not seem prepared to abdicate all responsibility for fraud. See Snyder, sufra
note 6, at 460. Perhaps mindful of this, eBay CEO Meg Whitman acknowledged that “we
[eBay] actually have a significant responsibility to make eBay as safe a site as possible to
trade on. We also need to communicate that users have a responsibility its well.” See
Hendren, supra note 12. “eBay is acutely aware that online commerce will not continue to
flourish if consumers lose confidence in the safety and security of their transactions.” eBny’s
Response to the FTC, supra note 28, at 1; see aLso Anderiesz, supra note 12. “eBay, like any
consumer business, has a strong interest in making its shopping place as safe as possible;
otherwise consumers will turn to competitors or reject online commerce sites altogether.“
e 3 4 s Response to the ITC, supra note 28, at 1.
According to Internet analyst Vernon Keenan: “If eBay hadn’t beefed up their security
they would eventually have hit a wall. Any negative perception ofsafety on eBay would have
turned off new users, especially as the demographics of the Internet move closer to the
regular population.” See Greg Miller, eBny ‘lightens Securi93rJVet Auctions; Technology:Moue By
Company ComesA$er Recent Incidents of Fraud andAbuse Involving Usen g I t s Web Site, L.A. TJMES,
Jan. 16, 1999, at C2.

’”

’”
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While the online auction sites may not currently have legal liability
for fraud on their sites, the sites arguably have a moral responsibility
to keep their sites as free from fraud as possible.’*’ Since morality is
not a line item on a financial statement, any appeal to the online
auction sites to curb fraud must be mandatory in nature, with
financial consequences for any failure to comply.
A second line of defense claimed by the online auction sites is that
their efforts at self-policing are the most effective way to prevent
online fraud. ‘K’ The sites vehemently oppose regulation, claiming
that their consumer protection measures are sufficient to safeguard
their users’ interests and that the online auction sites themselves are
in the best position to respond to issues of fraud, deception, and
misuse, obviating any need for regulation.’*“

I li I

See Marilyn Geewax, ‘4uction Sale Could Top $6 Billion B y JVext Year, PALM BEACHPOST,
at littI’://u.\~w.bearshop.net/;iuctions.htrnl IOct. 25, 19993; see aDo Snyder, supra note 6, at
459.
I113
In response to the FTC’s request for comments, six companies “on the leading edge of
the electronic commerce industry” argue “the U.S. government must continue to support
industy self-regulation and encourage industry participants in consunier education to avoid
stifling the growth and expansion of this dynamic medium.” Commenb of DoubleClick, Inc.,
GeoCities. Inktomi Corporation, Lycos, Inc., theglobe.com, inc., and Tkhoo! Inc. in Response to the FTC
Reque.rtforAcademicPapenand Atblic Commenb 1, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/
wiley.htm {Mar.26, 1999;.
eBay recognizes that the integrity of its site and the confidence of its users is its most
valuable cornrnodiv. It will continua to improve its consumer education and
protection programs to meet the growing challenges of Internet commerce. eBay
believes it car1 continue to meet these challenges without the stimulus of government
regulation, and that other e-commerce firms should be encouraged to do likewise.
e B q s Response to the F7C. supra note 28, at 9.
eBay has taken steps to decrease the incidence of fraud, adopting policies aimed at
preventing and detecting fraud. .%ccordingto Brad Handler, director of public policy for
?Bay, “eBay is a community that is working hard to create an environment of open, honest
trade. It’s incredibly difficult in the online arid offiine world to catch the dedicated crirninal,
but it doesn’t mean we aren’t trying.” Handler goes on to say that eBay cannot “proactively
monitor the site for illegal activity and that it relies on users to bring problems to its
attention.” See Beckett & Swartz. supra note 58. eBay’s company policy is to urge those who
believe they arc victims of fraud to report problems to eBay and then to local law
rriforcernent authorities. See id.; see also Crihb, mpra note 181; Finn et al., supra note 29, at

348.

In coniinents made to the FTC, eBay claimed:
In thc highly dynamic Internet marketplace, however, private firms such as eBay are
in the best position to design and implement creative programs to respond to
cousumer complaints about fraud, deception and misuse. Therefore, both domestic

’””
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The online auction sites worry that government regulation will
stifle growth in the online commerce w0r1d.I~~This self-serving
argument is made at the expense of consumers who are left without
any meaningful protection from online fraud. The online auction
sites claim to be in the best position to effectuate necessary changes.
While there may be some truth to this, the online auction sites seem
either unable or unwilling to take the steps necessary to stem the tide
of online fraud, or they are simply too slow in reacting to what they
see by putting effective policies into place.’**The online auction sites
want consumers to bear the risk of fraud, making the self-serving
claim that buyers can protect themselves through a variety of
completely voluntary tools and programs. In’The existing safeguards
are insufficient, setting up programs that are costly in terms of the
participants’ time and money, and amount to essentially no protection unless the participants are willing to undertake the effort, and in
some cases, the associated costs ofthe efforts. The increasing number
of online auction fraud complaints demonstrate that these safeguards

and foreign government agencies should resist the temptation to impose regulations
on online marketplaces and other forms of e-commerce in an effort to extend
consumer protection to this new form of commerce. Effective consumer protection
efforts are much more likely to emerge from industry self-regulation, “best practices”
and dispute resolution than from government intervention. Regardless of how well
meaning such intervention may be, it carries the serious risk of impeding the growth
of the emerging e-commerce marketplace without providing meaningful benefits to
consumers.
eBay’s Response to the FTC, supra note 28, at 2; see also Ed Ritchie, Auction Sites Urged to Protect
Users From Fraud, at http://www.auctionwatch.com/email/print.html?ret=/awdaily/
dailynews/march0l/l-031901.html(Mar. 19,2001);seealso Wojcik, supra note 92, at 894.
I87
eBay recognizes and supports the role that consumer protection and law
enforcement agencies have in investigating and prosecuting legitimate complaints of
consumer fraud, whether such fraud occurs over the telephone, in person or in
cyberspace. eBay is committed to working with such agencies to ensure that eBay’s
users’ rights are fully protected. Also, eBay encourages government agencies to
develop creative ways to respond more quickly to consumer complaints about online
transactions. Innovation is not, however, synonymous with regulation, and the
government should proceed cautiously to ensure that its policies do not unnecessarily
impede the growth of this new and dynamic marketplace.
eBay’s Responre to h FTC,supra note 28, at 8-9.
See Snyder, supra note 6, at 470.
la‘ “eBay is committed to effective self-regulation and has been proactive in implementing
programs and policies to empower and protect consumers.” eBay’s Responre to theFTC, sujra
note 28, at 1.
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are ultimately ineffective, primarily because the participants are
electing not to use them.'"' These safeguards include voluntary user
identification, escrowing funds, insurance, vetting offered goods,
feedback, and other fraud prevention efforts.

A. VoluntaT 7001and
s Programs Available on Online Auction Sites
1. Voluntary User Identification

Online auction participants can elect to participate in a voluntary
identity verification process. Online auction sites have had problems
finding a practical way to verify the personal identification information of their users. eBay had a verification program to check the basic
address information of its users, but could not provide any additional
assurance to its users about the reliability of potential trading
partners. So, eBay created a program that lets consumers supply
additional information including, Social Security number, driver's
license number, and date of birth, to qualify for status as a "verified
user.""" The data is crosschecked with Equifax Secure Inc. for a fivedollar fee paid for by the participants."" Once Equifax confirms the
information as accurate, an "ID Verify" icon appears next to the
user's name on the site.'"' To protect users' privacy, eBay never sees
this information and Equifax does not retain a record of information
submitted through this program.")' The identities of all buyers and
5ellers should be authenticated at no cost to the parties. This simply
should be a cost of doing business for the online auction sites.

See Snyder. slipni note 6, at 465; s e also
~ supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
See vB?p's Resporue to the F7%,supra note 28. at 3-4: see also Snyder, supra note 6, at 461
,
note 83; eBq Seric~s:Bueing and Selling Tools: ID Ve& Lngn, at
11.43; I J J W ~ supra
Iittp:/ /\*iuw.l~ages.ebay.com/senices/b~iyandsrll/ictverif~-login.htnil(last visited Mar. 9,
20021:eB?y lie@: Basics: FA@ L'enjed eBcy Lker. at http://pages.ebay.com/help/basics/fverify.htni1 (last visited Mar. 9: 20021. To date. eBay is the only major auction site to offer
this service. Yahoo! .\uctions offers credit card verification as its attempt to verify identities.
.See Yalioo! Gmerd Help. nf httI)://2ielp.yahoo.corii/help/us/auct/agen/agen-0~.~itm (last
visited Jan. 7, 20021.
I"' See Miller, supra note 183; see also Lowr)-, supra note 83; Swartz, supra note 175.
I!''
See e B y 3 Response to the FTC, supra note 28. at 3-4.
""

"'I

il'l

Id.
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2. Escrowing Funds
Online auction participants can elect to use an escrow service,
typically paying up to five percent of the total transaction value.'9'
The escrow fees are based on the amount of the transaction and the
method of payment.lgGA neutral third party holds the buyer's funds
until the purchased item arrives and is found to be what was bid for,
arriving in the condition described in the a~cti0n.l~'
The online auction sites often provide direct links to escrow
services, constituting at least their implicit recommendation. '')' But
less than one percent of eBay customers use escrow services, regarding them as "expensive and cumbersome."'"9 Of course, using an
escrow service can delay the transaction.""' But without it, the entire
burden of ensuring the merchandise bought and sold on an online
auction site arrives in the promised condition is placed on the buyer.
Instead, all payments above some de minimis amount should be
processed through escrow agents paid for by the online auction sites.
The sites should make favorable arrangements with independent
escrow houses or undertake the service themselves.

3 . Insurance
Online auction participants can elect to purchase insurance for
certain auction transactions, but because the dollar amount of the
typical online auction transaction is relatively low, insurers are not

See Internet Auctions: A Guide, supra note 10, at 2; see also Hendren, supra note 12.
See Geewax, supra note 184.
lg7 See Tradenabb, at http://www.tradenable.com/demo.html(last visited Mar. 9, 2002)
for a step-by-step explanation of the escrow process; see alro Ajer the Auction-Using Escrow, at
http://www.auctionwatch.com/email/print.htnil?ret=/awdaily/tipsandtactics/buyescrow.html; Hendren, supra note 12;Jerome, supra note 14.
1'18
eBay's web site contains a more explicit recommendation: "Based on historical data,
tradenable and eBay recommend that buyers and sellers use escrow services for transactions
greater than $500." See eBay Help: Cornmunip Standal.de Escrow, at http://pages.ebay.com/
help/community/escrow.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
''I' See Snyder, supra note 6, at 461 n.42. According to a 2000 poll conducted by Harris Poll
Online, 79% of the 2,196 respondents have never used an escrow service, 42% were not
familiar with escrow services, 30% thought escrow services were unnecessary, and 19% did
not want to pay the associated fees. See Online Auction Sumq &estionnaire, 5-6, at
http://www.nclnet.org/onlineauctions/auctionsurvey200 1ques.htm (Jan. 3 1, 200 1)
[hereinafter @estionnaire].
"I" See Internet Auctions: A Guide, supra note 10, at 2.
lg5

IYo
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rushing to get into this market."' Those that are in the market are
offering very limited benefits.'02
eBay's "Fraud Protection Program" covers most offered items for
up to $200, less a $25 deductible. Amazon.com's A-to-2 Guarantee
reimburses up to $250 on standard purchases and up to $2,500 on
Amazon.com Payment transactions, with a lifetime maximum of
three claims.'"" The program covers failure to receive merchandise
paid for and receipt of merchandise that is materially different than
represented.'n' The link between the low dollar amount of the
average online auction transaction and the low dollar amount of
insurance currently offered to online auction participants will likely
continue until the insurance companies raise the coverage limits. In
the alternative, the online auction sites should offer insurance
themselves, covering the full value of transactions, at some reasonable
price. This would encourage users to purchase more expensive items
without additional risk.'""

4. Vetting Offered Goods
Online auction participants can elect to have some offered items
authenticated. The seller nominally pays for the authentication, but
the payment is typically reflected in an increase in the winning bid,
due to the additional security. The online auction sites view the

See supra notes 5(t5 1.
See Margaret Rane, e B q Offers Secung M e m r e s , ZDNET NHVS (Jan.15, 1999), at
http:/ /www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/Ooh2C45860%2C2
187917%2COO.html (on file
with the author); see also eBny Raises UserAgreenimtto Addras Fraud, L.,4. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999,
at C2; eBay's Response to the Federal Trade Cummkion, supra note 28, at 5; e B y Help: Cummunig
(last
Standards: Insurnrue Process, at http:/ /pages.ebay.com/help/community/ins-process.html
visited Mar. 9, 2002j.
2113
See Nancy L. Hix, Understanding Insurance, at http://www.auctionwatch.com/email/
print.html?ret=awdaily/tipsandtactics/buy-insurance2.html
(last visited Mar. 9,2002); see
also Dave
Baranowski, Supplemental Insurance: Is I t W o r t h It?, at
w'

I'

http://www.auctionwatch.com/email/print.html?ret=awdaily/features/insurance/2.html
(Apr. 27,2001'1.
'"I

See e B g He&: Communig Standardc Fraud Protection Rogram, at http://pages.ebay.com/

help/community/insurance.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002); see aho eBny Help: Communig
Standards: Fraud Protection Eligibility Checklist and Claims Process, at
http:/ /pages.ebay.com/help/community/ins-guide.htm1 (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
1"13
See in+a note 253-55 and accompanyingtext for a discussion ofthe disputes examined

in the eBay-Online Ombudsman Office program ranging from $1 to $15,000.
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transactions on their sites as private and do not vet the offerings or
descriptions themselves. eBay's documentation contains prominent
and unequivocal disclaimers,warning buyers that the auctioned items
have not been verified by eBay, and that the buyer should beware."'"
eBay has begun to provide third parties to authenticate certain
offered items, at the option and expense of the sellers.207The online
auction sites will try to remove outright frauds, as they are legally
obligated to take an item off their site within five days of receiving
notice.'08 But according to eBay, it will not remove an item unless the
complainant can offer solid proof.209 Accordingly, there could be
inauthentic items offered for sale simply because the proof was not
"solid" enough in eBay's opinion.
The existence and quality of the offered merchandise should be
represented to the buyer, or the buyer should have the opportunity
to inspect the goods. It is unfair to require the buyer to assume all the
risks of the condition of the merchandise without the opportunity to
evaluate such condition.

One eBay disclaimer reads:
NOTE: The opinions expressed by these evaluators are theirs alone. eBay does not
examine the items listed on its site and does not have the expertise to evaluate items,
eBay cannot guarantee the findings of these evaluators -authentication and grading
are difficult, often subjective matters where the experts themselves occasionally
disagree. Each of the companies listed on this page that provides authentication
and/or grading services is an independent company, and eBay is not responsible in
any way for any action, inaction, opinion, or service in connection with these
companies. You should review the credentials of each company and use your own
judgment before using a company's services.
eBy Help; Communip Standards: Authaticatiun and Grading: Oumiew, at http:// pages.ebay.com/
help/community/auth-overview.htm1 (last visited Mar. 9,2002).
?"' For its more expensive items, eBay began offering a service called Great Collections in
conjunction with Buttefields, a San Francisco auction house eBay purchased. Similarly,
Amazon.com has partnered up with Sotheby's, using a network of art dealers approved by
Sotheby's. According to Amazon.com, the majority of the high-end art on its site is sold
through the Sotheby's section. See Hansell & Dobrzynski, supra note 70; see also Scally, supra
note 22. eBay's Great Collections program was disappointing in terms ofvolume and eBay
substituted a re-tooled version called eBay Premier. See Cohen, supra note 22. eBay began
using Collectors Universe and other third parties to authenticate certain products. SeeJoseph
Menn, Technohg: eBy Shares Surge as Fim Resolves Fraud Probe, L A . TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1999, at
c3.
' 0 8 See I ~ w r ysupra
,
note 83 (quoting eBay general counsel Michael Jacobsen).
See Hansell & Dobrzynski, supra note 70; see also Streitfeld, supra note 22; The Bidding
Game, supra note 12.
2"6

'"'
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5. Feedback
Online auction participants can elect to educate themselves about
their auction counterparts, with varying degrees of reliability, by
accessing the online auction sites' feedback forums. The online
auction sites solicit feedback from their users, in the hopes of turning
their customers into the equivalent of their police force.'" For
example, if a user earns a low enough feedback rating, eBay will
automatically suspend membership and the user will be unable to list
or bid on items."'
But if the feedback area is not monitored, query how reliable such
feedback actually is. What is there to stop a shill bidder from posting
fraudulent feedback under another ofhis user names, showing himself
in a favorable light? eBay expressly forbids shill bidding, but permits
users more than one Internet name, making shill bidding less easy to
detect by a cursory examination of bidders' user names.'"
This purported self-policing mechanism could in fact turn out to be
simply a mechanism for self-promotion and promotion of friends.
Feedback comments must be related to actual transactions, as
opposed to comments made about particular buyers or sellers in the
abstract .'I3

"" See eBcy Smices: the Feedback Fonrm, nt http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/
feedback.htm1 'last visited Mar. 9, 20021.
The forum uses a numeric rating system, symbols and written comments to create a
unique profile of its traders. Specifically. different color stars represent a user's
"feedback rating;" that rating, which appears next to a user's name, shows how many
positive. negative or neutral points the user has accuniulated from other trading
partners. Short written comments offer insights into how satisfied others have been
with this trading partner.
~ B qResponse
l
to the I T C , suprn note 28, at 4; see also Hansel1 & Dobrzynski, mp7a note 70. Of
the 2,196 people surveyed in the Harris Poll Online, fifty-one percent always check
information available about the seller on the auction site before bidding, and thirty-six
percent usually check the information. See euestionnaire, sup7a note 199, at 2.
"I
"You may nor take any action that may undermine the integrity ofthe feedback system.
If you earn a net feedback rating of-4 (minusfour), your membership will be automatically
suspended, and you will be unable to list or bid." eBcy I,'seTAgreetnmt, supra note 34, 4 8.
' I L See The Bidding Game, supra note 12.
? I 3 eBay adopted this approach last year. See eBcyj Response to the FTC, sup7a note 28, at 5.
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6. Other Fraud Prevention Efforts
Online auction participants can elect to avail themselves of other
programs aimed at preventing fraud. eBay has a Non-Paying Bidder
Program designed to assist sellers who are having trouble collecting
the auction proceeds from buyers; the program provides an appeals
process for buyers who dispute their categorization as non-paying

bidder^.^ l4
eBay also operates its Safe Harbor program, a “comprehensive
safety resource and protective arm.’’‘L15
eBay claims to cooperate fully

The parties are encouraged to contact each other after the auction has ended. Ifa seller
has not gotten a response from the successfulbidder or feels the buyer will not pay, the seller
must file a “Non-Paying Buyer Alert Form” within forty-five days after the end of the
auction. Then eBay gets involved, sending an email to both parties, reminding the buyer
to pay and disclosing the consequences of failing to pay. The consequences range from a
warning to an indefinite suspension, depending on how many times this bidder has failed to
pay. See eBq Help: Community Standards: Policies and Conduct: &on-Paying Bidder, at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/npb.html(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
‘I’
eBq Help: Communig Standards: eBq Help: Rules and Sajtep, at http://pages.ebay.com/
help/community/index.html (lastvisited Mar. 9,2002). eBay’s SafeHarbor reporting system
enables users to file fraud complaints at an early stage when it is still possible to settle them
amicably. Specifically, when a user files a complaint with eBay’s online fraud reporting
service, eBay automatically sends an e-mail to the other trader involved. eBay clearly
informs the trader about the complaint and gives him or her the opportunity to resolve the
problem expeditiously. Also, eBay may inform the trader that failure to resolve the
complaint may result in notification of the appropriate agencies by the complaining party.
The “SafeHarbor” program is divided into “dedicated departments” and “services for
your protection.” The dedicated departments are Fraud Protection and Prevention; Items
that may not be allowed for sale; and Investigations. The “services for your protection”
include Feedback Forum; Escrow; Fraud Protection Program; ID Verify; Authentication
Services; Verified Rights Owner Program; and Dispute Resolutions. eBay can suspend or
terminate the accounts of anyone it suspects of engaging in fraudulent activity in connection
with the site. Id. “Without limiting any other remedies, eBay may suspend or terminate
your account if we suspect that you (by conviction, settlement, insurance or escrow
investigation, or otherwise) have engaged in fraudulent activity in connection with our site.”
eBq UserAgeement,supra note 34,g 5.3.
Under its SafeHarbor program, eBay monitors and investigates conduct that
undermines the integrity or fairness ofthe auction process. Such conduct may include
abuse of its feedback forum process, bidding offenses, such as attempts to artificially
raise the level of a bidding price (called shill bidding), selling offenses, such as failure
to complete the transaction (called deadbeat bidders), contact information or
identification offenses, such as providing patently false contact information and other
offenses such as sending spam (unsolicited commercial e-mail). As part of its updated
SafeHarbor initiative, eBay has strengthened its deadbeat bidder and shill bidder
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and promptly with law enforcement authorities to investigate,
prosecute, and convict those engaged in fraud.'" eBay agreed in
February 2000 to forward complaints about fraud on its site directly
to the FTC."7 eBay is developing a database that identifies public
consumer protection agencies in each state, and a procedure for
forwarding its users' complaints about fraud directly to those
agencies."8
These nominally protective measures may in some cases raise the
transaction costs of online auction sites to the participants, and thus
may be of limited usefulness."' All of these measures amount to
essentially no protection unless the buyer is willing to voluntarily take
advantage of them, and in some cases, bear the associated costs.220
This is neither an effective nor fair way to apportion the risk of fraud
between the buyers, sellers, and online auction sites. A more
appropriate approach to curbing online auction fraud would be to use
regulation, enforcement, and consumer education, imposing financial
liability on the online auction sites for any failure to follow the
regulations.'"

policies by adding tougher sanctions. Depending on the seriousness of the offense,
eBa); may warn offenders, or suspend them (,temporarily or permanently) from the
site. In appropriate cases, eBay may also notify the proper law enforcement
authorities.
eByi Response to the FTC. m p ~ note
a
28, at 6.
'""
See Swartz, supra note 175.
'Ii
See Fields, acpm note 36; see also e B q to Submit c'ser Complnints to FTC, L . h TIMES,Feb.
15.2000, at C3.
"I" See eBays Response to the FTC, supra note 28, at 6-7.
"" See Hetcher; supra note 73.
2%
The existing safeguards and multiple proposed guidelines ultimately fail to attack the
issue of online auction fraud at its source. The individual auction house's selfregulation attempts to solve the problem by setting up rarely used and cumbersome
programs thar are only initiated if the consumer chooses. The consumer protection
groups have no real authority and only hope to educate the consuming public. The
FTC has limited resources and cannot afford to prosecute every individual fraudulent
online auction user. For obvious reasons, these three lines of defense ultimately fail
to provide the consunien with the protection from fraud they should be entitled to
expect. The most efficient method available for stopping online auction fraud is to
establish liability with the one entity most capable of ending the fraudulent practice:
the online auction house.
Snyder, supra note 6>at 465.
":I'
Id. at 456-57.
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V. ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTERESOLUTION
MECHANISMS
AVAILABLETO VICTIMS OF ONLINE AUCTIONFRAUD
While defrauded online auction participants wait for lawmakers to
hold the online auction sites financially responsible for the fraud on
their sites, they can seekjudicial relief. They can file lawsuits against
their transaction counterparts, assuming they can find and obtain
jurisdiction over such counterparts, and afford the cost of litigation.
However, the Internet's capacity to circumvent and bypass geographic boundaries can create problems both in obtainingjurisdiction
over unwilling defendants and in enforcing any judgments actually
obtained.222 The defrauded participants may not have enough
information on their counterparts to physically locate them. Because
the average online auction transaction consumer loss is so low,
traditional litigation may be cost-pr~hibitive."~
One condition for the continued growth of online commerce is that
consumers have confidence that they will be able to obtain meaningful recourse in the event of an online commerce di~pute."~If the
process to access such recourse is too complicated, or the cost of such

"'

Cyberspace differs from real space in at least three ways connected to the formation and
resolution of disputes: (I) cyberspace has become a "community" complete with customs,
norms and rules that differ from those in the real world; (2) in cyberspace, communication
transcends time, space, and physical reality; and (3) cyberspace eliminates geographic
boundaries. See Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dtspute Resolution: a 3stems Approach
-Potentia4 Froblmns, and a Proposal, 3 HARV.NEGOT.L. REV. 175, 177-81 (1998).
Jurisdictional challenges are just one of the many challenges cyberspace poses to
governments. The authority ofgovernments, which has traditionally been evident in
a powerful and state-subsidized court and regulatory process, is less obvious online.
Government has a role to play but it is not necessarily the same role government plays
in offline consumer disputes. National authorities cannot claim sovereign regulatory
authority over parts of cyberspace in the same way that they exercise authority over
territories.
E t h a n K a t s h , O n l i n e ADR i n O n l i n e Consumer D i s p u t e s 2 , a t
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisresolution/comments/katsh.htm(Apr. 12, 2001); see also
Summa7 offiblic Workshop,June 6-7, 2000, Federal 'Trade Commkslon, Depadment of Commerce, at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisresolution/summary.htm(Nov. 2000) [hereinafter Summa7
qfPublic Workshop];Ponte, supra note 150, at 56 n.3. SeeJohn Rothchild, Protectinpthe&tal
Consumer: 7 h e Limits of Cyberspace Utopiankm, 74 IND.LJ. 893 (1999), for a discussion of
jurisdiction over online conduct.
223 See Ponte, supra note 150, at 89.
224 See Public Comments
theNationalArbit7ation Forum-AltematiueDispute Resolutionfor Consumer
Transactiom in the Borderless Online Marketplace 4,at http: //www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisreolution/
comments/anderson.htm (Apr. 18,2000).

628 / Vol. 39 / American Business Law Journal
recourse exceeds the amount in controversy, the aggrieved party has
no incentive to seek such recourse. The continually increasing
volume of e-commerce results in an increasing volume of disputes. If
traditional litigation is not a feasible option to settle such disputes,
defrauded consumers must seek out other avenues of relief.""
Arguably, in response to the lack of meaningful regulatory
protection and opportunities for judicial relief through traditional
litigation for defrauded online auction participants, a number of
online alternative dispute resolution (ADR)sites have cropped up on
the Internet. For a sampling of current online ADR projects and
websites, see Appendix A attached hereto.'2" These sites seek to
provide a mechanism for resolution of disputes arising from online
transactions. Most of these sites are no more than a few years old,
and are, for the most part, for-profit enterprise^.'^^ There are a few
exceptions, such as the early online ADR projects that were not-forprofit sites run by universities, but they are the distinct
The targeted audience of the various online ADR sites range from
defrauded consumers to big corporations and their customers.
Likewise, the services of the online ADR sites range from simply
providing a forum for participants to air their views of sellers all the
way to providing binding resolution of disputes."0

"-' See hi. Ethan Katsh, DiputeResolution in Cyberspace,28 CO?iN.L. RE\'.
953 (1996);see alro
Katsh,supranote 222, at 3; E t h n Katsh et al., E-Commerce. E-Diputes, and E-LhputeResolution:
In the Shadow of%Bay hw':15 O H I O S.1.. J. 0 3 DISP.RESOI.. 705, 725 (2000);Ponte, supra
note 150, at 57,91.
-For a complete list of such sites, see Ci~nentOnline A D R Projects and Web Sites, at
http://www.ornbuds.org/center/onlineadr.htni
(-1pr.10,200 1); seealso Out of Court Settlement
of Lhputes Concemirg e-commerce Conrumer Transactions: An Incentoly .f Cunent Approaches, at
http://~w.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/act/online~t~st/ICCInvento~.doc
(last visited
Mar. 9, 2002).
''"'
See Katsh, supra note 222.
1'8
-The University of Massachusetts's Center for Information Technology initiated The
Online Ombuds Offce in May 1996, to provide mediation for disputes arising on the
Internet. See Prdessor Ethan Katshi Response to the Federal Trade CommisSiOn's Requestfor Academic
Papers (2ndPublic Comments 2, at http://u~w/ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/ethankatsh.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2002); see aDo Ponte, supra note 150, at 65.
"" See Lan Q. Hang, Online Dispute Resolution Sixtems: T?teFuture of Cyberspace Law, 41 SANTA
CIAKA L. RE\.. 837, 845-50 (2001).
,I,,<>
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ADR refers generally to various out-of-court methods for resolving
disputes, including negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.23oAll of
these processes are less formal than litigation, and are typically also
faster and less expensive.231These traditional forms ofADR are fairly
easily adaptable to the online arena, utilizing the unique characteristics of the Internet to settle online
Online ADR takes
advantage of the Internet in three ways: (1) when online, one can
handle matters that previously required physical presence at a
distance; (2) when online, one can handle matters quickly, if not
instantaneously, that might have been cumbersome or, in fact,
impossible, previously; and (3) when online, one acquires
information-processing capabilities beyond those of human capabilities.233
Online ADR processes fall into two primary categories: automated
processes and neutral-managed processes.234 The automated
processes are appropriate for disputes involving parties whose

”” See Ethan Katsh, Online Dispute Resolution: Some Lessons Learned From the E-Commerce
Reuolution, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 810, 812 (2001).
23 I Negotiation is a consensual bargaining process aimed at achieving a mutually
acceptable settlement, using direct communication between the parties to a dispute, typically
with no third parties involved. See Public Comments b~ WebMediateAkmatiue Dispute Resolution
for Commer Transactions in the Bordmhs Online Marketplace 2, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
altdisresolution/comments/bakerryan.pdf (Spring 2000) bereinafter Public Comments /y
WebMediate]. Mediation is a process in which a neutral third party mediator assists the
parties in finding their own solution to the dispute. See Hang, supra note 229, at 842. The
process tends to be voluntary, informal, flexible, and private. See id.; see also Frequently Asked
Questions, at http://www.webmediate.com/faq.html(last visited Mar. 9,2002) [hereinafter
WebMediate FAQ. The mediator does not make decisions for the parties. Rather, she helps
them communicate and find common ground. See Smices: What is ADR? 1, at
http://www.onlineresolution.com/whatisadr.cfm(last visited Mar. 9,2002). Arbitration is
more formal than either negotiation or mediation. The parties select an arbitrator, typically
an impartial professional with some expertise in the area of the dispute, to hear presentations
from the parties and render a decision. Id. Arbitration cases involve choice-of-law issues,
and are typically governed by a specified set of procedural rules. See Public Comments b
WebMediate, supra note 23 1, at 2. Arbitration can be binding or non-binding. Id.
*“* “In the existing and currently functioning arena of domain names, arbitration has been
workable, in insurance claims disputes a totally automated negotiation process has been in
growing use, and in the online auction context, mediation may be preferred.” Katsh, supra
note 222, at 2.
233 See Katsh, supra note 230, at 816-17.
234 See Public Comments b WebMediate, supra note 23 1, at 5.
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interests can be easily quantified.'"j The process is typically managed
by a computer using "blind bidding" whereby the parties to the
dispute have an online forum to submit settlement offers. If the
settlement offers fall within some pre-determined and pre-approved
range, the computer program plays arbitrator, settling the dispute,
with the parties splitting any difference. The entire process occurs
online; the parties are given password-protected access to their
dispute negotiations.236 If the two parties' bids never get close
enough, they will never know what the other side bid.'37 The online
ADR firms are compensated by a percentage of the settlement.238
In order for an automated process to resolve consumer disputes
successfully, the parties must be in agreement about the basic facts,
including who is the injured party. Also, money damages alone must
be able to make the injured party whole. The only item to be
resolved by the process is the actual amount of the damages to be
awarded. If these conditions are satisfied, query why the parties
would pay additional sums to a third party to come up with the dollar
amount of the damages rather than hashing it out
Perhaps it may be worth the cost of blind bidding to not reveal their
bids unless they are accepted.
The other category of online ADR, the neutral-managed processes,
offers the parties to a dispute a variety of ADR services, with the
benefits of the Internet along with access to trained neutral professionals to assist in resolving the
The neutral professionals
can monitor the settlement negotiations and participate as negotiators, mediators, or arbitrators, using the Internet to reduce overhead
costs and time delays."' This form of online ADR is appropriate
when the conditions for automated blind bidding are not met. The
parties may disagree on the quality, authenticity, or condition of the
offered item, or on some other term in their agreement.*" In such

'".' Examples of this fonn of online ADR include Cybersettle.com, clickNsettle.com, and
SettIesmart.com. See Ponte, supra note 150, at 66 nn.44-46.
"" See Summary ofPublu Wmkshop,supra now 222, at 5.
'-" ( j
See Frequent4 Asked @&ions, at http://www.wecansettle.com/pages/faqs.html(last
visited Mar. 9,2002j.
"'if' See W'ebMediate FA% supra note 23 1.
'.'" See Ponte, supra note 150, at 66 nn.43-47.
'"' See Public Commentr Ly WebMedinte, supra note 23 1, at 6.
211 Id.

'("See Ponte, supra note 150, at 70.
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cases, the neutral third party tries to negotiate a mutually satisfactory
The benefits of online ADR include easy accessibility, in that
online ADR is available on demand and at the parties' convenience,
without regard to traditional business
Also, online ADR can
be more convenient than traditional ADR in that participants do not
need to travel to resolve their
Online ADR is typically
much less expensive than litigation or even traditional ADR.24G
Additionally, online ADR sidesteps the jurisdictional issues inherent
in many online
Online ADR also can be conducted on a
large scale. There are no comprehensive statistics on online ADR
use, but SquareTrade claims to handle over 12,000 claims per
month,248and Cybersettle claims to have helped its clients settle over
$50 million in claims.24g
Online ADR is not a panacea, however. The parties must have
access to any necessary software and must have some degree of
proficiency with computer^.^^" There are security and confidentiality
concerns inherent in using the Internet.25' Finally, the parties must
agree to submit to the process and to be bound by its outcome.
Online ADR will be of no use if one of the parties elects not to
participate, or participates but then does not honor the resolution
generated by the process. This may be the outcome in an online
auction fraud case, and if so, the availability of low cost, accessible
online ADR services will then be of no use to the defrauded party
who will have to rely on the protections and avenues of relief
provided by lawmakers, which are currently insufficient.
Various law enforcement officials and companies interested in ecommerce are working together to craft a workable online ADR
system, perhaps to ease public concern about preventing and

243
244
"45
?46

Examples of this form of online ADR include SquareTrade and Internet Neutral. Id.
See Hang, supra note 229, at 854.
Id.
Id,

Id.
See SquareTrade Builds Trust,at http://www.squaretrade.com/cnt/jsp/abt/aboutus.jsp;
jsessionid=foOoabey3l?vhostid=tomcat3&st (last visited Mar. 9,2002).
?*' See CybersettleAbout Us, at http://www.cybersettle.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 7,
2002).
250 See Hang, supra note 229, at 859.
151 Id.
247
"48
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prosecuting online fraud.2"" Even the online auction sites have shown
an interest in online ADR. During the spring of 1999, eBay joined
with the Online Ombuds Ofice (000)at the University of Massachusetts to form a pilot program for its dissatisfied online auction
customers."'.' Almost 150 disputes arising out of online auctions were
mediated in the two-week pilot period.'"4 Despite the fact that the
average online auction transaction is $478, the value of the disputes
mediated ranged from 8 1 to $1 5,000.2'"

,I-/)

InJune 2000, the FTC and the Department of Commerce sponsored a public workshop
mtitled ",Vteniative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Transactions." The participants
included representatives from academia. consumer groups, industry, and government. See
Simima7y OJ Rcblic IVorkshop. supra note 222. The participants "examined existing and
developing :DR programs, incentives and disincentives to use ADR, how to make ,4DR fair
and effective, and the role ofstakeholden. iricludingconsumers, businesses and governments,
in developing and implementing .XDR program." Id. The participants recommended
cooperation in the following areas: (1; finding global solutions to address global transactions;
i"i pursuing technological innovations; ,3: pursuing multiple ADR programs; (4)
ensuring
fairness and effectiveness of :\DR programs; (5) consumer and business education; and (6)
action against fraudulent and deceptive practices related to ADR. Id. at 3. The participants
focused primarily on the proposal for online ADR:
The goal is to resolve [e-commerce disputes] in a manner that reflects that the
monetary value of these disputes, while important to individual consumers, is often
small in amount. Therefore, traditional court-based solutions, including small claims
courts, particularly for people who live in different countries, are by and large
impractical.
Id. In addition, conferences and workshops on online . O R were held by the European
Union, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Global Business Dialogue, and the World Intellectual
Property Organization. SeeKatsb supm note 230, at 813-14. In addition, the American Bar
Association Section on Dispute Resolution, the CPR Institute of Dispute Resolution, and
SPIDR all held sessions on online ADR at their respective annual meetings. Id.
'..'' See Ethan Katsh & Janet Rifkin, Online Dtspute Resolution: Introduction 1, at
http:/ /www.disputes.net/cybenvei-k2001 /OnlirieDisputeResolutionIntro. htm (lastvisited
Mar. 9, 20021; see aLo littp://www.disputes.net/cybe~eek2OOO/ebay/eba~ntro.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2002:.
''.'I See OnlineADR, supra note 223. .I link was placed on the eBay customer service page,
telling users that they could get assistance with transaction-related disputes by clicking on a
link and filling out a complaint form. eBay did nothing to publicize the service, and the
customer service page was two levels from eBay's home page. Nonetheless, in a two-week
period, 225 users filed complaints. See Katsh, et al., supra note 225, at 709. Of these 225
complaints, the 000 attempted mediation with only 144. Id. at 712.
,,-See Katsh & Rifkin, supra note 253, at I ; see also supra note 50.
-,I-

-.'I
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At the completion ofthe pilot program with the 000,eBayjoined
with SquareTrade in a similar program to provide mediation services
for its dissatisfied users.25GThe eBay-SquareTrade pilot program
provided free online dispute resolution services on items sold for at
least $100 on e B a ~ . ~The
~ ’ pilot was illustrative for the two companies in terms of creating a greater understanding of the issues involved
in online ADR.25*Since the end of the pilot program in June 2000,
eBay users can utilize SquareTrade’s Online Dispute Resolution to
settle disputes independently without a mediator using SquareTrade’s
Web-based Direct Negotiation
or they can use a
“SquareTrade Neutral” mediator or arbitrator.26o SquareTrade’s
Direct Negotiation service is free.26’Using a SquareTrade mediator

?”
SquareTrade is an online ADR site that, among other services, provides e-commerce
auction disputes through direct negotiation and mediation. See http://www.squaretrade.com
(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
According to eBay’s website in July1999: “SquareTrade is offering its online dispute
resolution service to eBay users for FREE for those items that sellfor at least $ZOO during this
pilot period.” See Dispute Rarolution Overview: Who Can Use ThzS Service and How Much Does it
Cost?, at http://pages.ebay.com/services/buyandsell/disputeres.html (last visited July 17,
2000) (original emphasis in bold) (on file with author).
257 The pilot period ran until June 2000. See Claire Barliant, Bound To Happen: E-Commerce
hsputes Spawn ClicWsettle, FUI,’I‘ON COUNTY DA11.Y REP.,June 23, 2000.
According to Steve Abernathy, CEO and founder of SquareTrade:
What we’ve learned in our pilot with eBay is how to recognize and list common types
of disputes that occur, alongside their outcomes. We’re essentially building case law
for online commerce. We’re also taking suggestions from online mediators and
adding that to the list of solutions to different kinds of problems.
Jenny Oh, Fair and Square, THEININJSTRY
STANDAKI),at http://www.thestandard.
com/article/O, 1902,18725,OO.html (Oct. 2, 2000).
‘j9 Direct negotiation on SquareTrade involves only the parties to the dispute; they
negotiate through password-protected pages without a mediator. SeeHeLFLhputeResolution:
Direct Nepotiation, at http://www.squaretrade.com/cnt/jsp/hlp/help_odr_case_filelisp;
jsessionid=vh3pwa7Od2:vhost (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
26‘’ See H e l p l h p u t e Resolution: Care Filing and Responding, at http://www.squaretrade.
com/cnt/jsp/hlp/help_odr_casejsp?vhostid=tomcat 1Lhtmpzsquaretrade (lastvisited Mar.
9, 2002).
26’ According to SquareTrade, more than eighty percent of cases are resolved with the use
of the Direct Negotiation technology, without requiring the services of a SquareTrade
Neutral (mediator or arbitrator). See Help0;FPute Rarolution:Mediation, at http://www.square
trade.com/cntl/jsp/hlp/help_odr_medljsp?vhostid~tomcat2~~p~squ~etrade
(lastvisited
Mar. 9, 2002).
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will cost the participants fifteen dollars; the remainder of the fee is
paid by eBay.'"'
Online ADR, like any new technology, may be disruptive to those
comfortable with the omine ADR processes. But online ADR, either
as a totally new approach, or as a modification to existing ADR
processes, is becoming much harder to ignore."'3 In the absence of
meaningful protection for defrauded online auction participants
through regulation and enforcement, the need for ADR will likely
grow dramatically. The judicial system does not have the resources
or specialized knowledge necessary to handle a flood of Internetrelated lawsuits, with their complicated jurisdictional issues. Online
ADR is a logical approach to resolving Internet-based disputes
without resorting to litigation. Online ADR services must be easy to
use, convenient, and must give the users a sense of security and
confidentiality in and about the process.""' Because the average
consumer loss on an online auction transaction is so low, the cost of
online ADR services will need to be correspondingly low enough that
disputants will avail themselves of the services. This may require
some funding by the online auction sites themselves, as a way to
compensate those users who were victims of fraud on their sites.26'

CONCL'C:SION
An aggrieved party using an online auction site, which specifically
disclaims responsibility for determining the authenticity of sellers'
merchandise, can prevail legally against the seller only in the event
that the seller makes materially false statements in describing the
auctioned item."'" This is age-old common law, and remains sound
today. But the online auction sites that facilitate the fraudulent
transactions simply by providing the forum for the exchange should
not have immunity from liability for such fraud. Under current law,

?I>?

Id,

See Katsh & Rifkin, supra note 253, at 2.
'''i See Hang, supra note 229, at 862.
'IJi See Ponte, supra note 150, at 91.
""' See Dobrzynski, mpra note 103.

""
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a fraud cause of action cannot be sustained against an online auction
site.2G7But as technology changes, so too should the law.268
The online auction sites claim they are merely providing the
meeting place for independent parties who assume all the risk of any
transaction the site makes possible. As such, the online auction sites
claim immunity from any responsibility for fraud occurring on the
very sites over which they have exclusive control.269
The FTC should use its substantial regulatory authority to craft
binding regulations for online auction sites. A starting point for the
regulations could be to build on the steps that some of the online
auction sites are already undertaking, albeit with varying degrees of
enthusiasm. The regulations should include ideas such as authenticating participants’ identities, limiting the number of user names per
participant, verifying the creditworthiness of participants, providing
free escrow services, offering insurance for the full amount of
transactions, offering authentication ofitems for sale, and establishing
mandatory record-keeping provisions, along with any other steps
necessary to provide the highest level of consumer protection possible.
Any failure to comply with the regulations should result in financial
liability to the online auction site. Consumer confidence is the key to

’?”
“Attorney [Brian] Brokate [who has a full time staff tracking online knockoffs in luxury
goods] concedes that online auctioneers probably can’t be held legally responsible unless
they’re informed of a specific fraud and refuse to act. eBay has been quick to help so far, he
said.” See Hendren, supra note 12.
?GO
As legislators at both the national and local levels attempt to create regulatory
schemes for Internet commerce, and as both state and federal courts adjudicate an
increasing number of Internet-based disputes, the importance ofbetter understanding
the implications of regulating the Internet as interstate commerce becomes
paramount. Clearly, the Internet is evolving and developing at a much more rapid
pace than any other mechanism of commerce. Most scholars, legislators, and
practitioners would agree that the Internet has not reached its final form. Regulators
must be careful not to arrest this evolution. Yet, a proper regulatory scheme poses the
opportunity to make the Internet more stable, to increase confidence in its ability to
accommodate commercial transactions, and to reduce uncertainty about liability for
Internet-based activities. Such a scheme would likely accelerate, rather than arrest,
the growth ofelectronic commerce and Internet-based technology. The path towards
such a scheme will necessarily require us to answer questions about how much
regulation is appropriate, who should regulate, and how.
Charles R. Topping, ?he Surf; Up, But who Owns the Beach?-mo Should Reelate Commerce
on the Internet?, 13 NOTKEDAME
J.L. ETHICS
& lW.
POI.’Y 179, 194-95 (1999).
See Finn et al., subra note 29, at 352.

’“”
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realizing the potential for growth in the Internet. Online auction sites
should not be permitted to reach out for their percentage of the
transactions with one hand, while at the same time covering their eyes
to the fraud on their own sites with the other hand.
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APPENDIX: ONLINE ADR PROJECTS AND WEBSITES
The following is a sampling of current online ADR projects and
websites, with brief descriptions of the services offered.27”
The targeted audiences of these online ADR sites range from
defrauded consumers to big corporations and their customers and
their services range from simply providing a forum for participants to
air their views of sellers all the way to providing binding resolution^.'^^
Some of the sites may be appropriate for online auction disputes.
123Settle.com: in association with ARC-Alternate Resolution
Centers, this site provides a “full service on-line settlement program” including facilitated negotiation, arbitration, and evaluation
services using blind bidding, which involves the confidential
submission of offers and demands which are compared by the
123Settle program.272
AUsettle.com:this site provides double-blind negotiation to settle
almost any kind of insurance claim. Upon settlement, the insurance company involved pays a $200 fee.273
BBB Dispute Resolution: this site provides national dispute
resolution services, including conciliation, mediation, and arbitrat i ~ n Individual
. ~ ~ ~ Better Business Bureaus (“BBB”)operate their
own dispute resolution programs for companies and customers in
their areas.275More than 100 BBBs participate in BBB CARE, a
standardized dispute settlement program coordinated by the
Council of Better Business Bureaus.276
The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators: this site offers
mediation, arbitration, and online consumer arbitration in the

27” For a complete list of such sites, see Cuvent Online ADR Projects and Web Sites, at
http://www.ombuds.org/center/onlineadr.htm(Apr. 10,200 1); seealm Outof Court Settlement

of Disputes Conceming e-commerce Commer Transactiom: An Inuentozy o f Current Approaches, at
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/act/online_trust/ICCInventory.doc(last visited
Mar. 9,2002) bereinafter ICC Invento~].
27‘ See Hang, supra note 229.
272 Http://www.123settle.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2001) (on file with the author).
273 See http://www.allsettle.com/faq.htni(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
l i 4 See http://www.bbb.org/complaints/aboutResolution.asp
(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
27s Id.
?7c Id.
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United Kingd~m.’~’
ClaimResolver: this site seeks to “enable all parties to reduce the
time and cost of resolving claims by creating and implementing the
most effective and efficient Internet-based dispute resolution
programs available in the market.”278The service is appropriate
for claims “where settlement will be based on a dollar payment.”27q
The parties seek settlement using any of the sites programs:
Offer/Demand Protocol, Maximum/Minimum Option, Finding
Negotiation Parameters, Quick Settlement Program and MultiDefendant/Aggregate Settlement.‘8” The standard fee to enroll a
claim is $35. If the program generates a settlement under $10,000,
a “success fee” of $250 is charged to the parties; if the program
generates a settlement of $ 10,000 or more, the “success fee” is

$350.‘8‘
ClickNsettle: this negotiation site started in June 1999 with the
objective of offering “online computer assisted method for settling
dispute by giving its users the power to negotiate settlements with
total confidentiality.”2*’ The negotiation service deals with cases
involving every area of law. Users agree to be legally bound by
any settlement reached through ClickNsettle, and any such
settlement is a bar to any further claim or cause of action arising
form the same facts.‘8’ The site provides Web-enabled blind
bidding negotiation as well as in-person, video-conferenced, or
paper arbitration and mediation.2H’Cases that do not settle during
online negotiations can be automatically submitted to the site’s inperson division for arbitration or mediation.“’ The site has
worked with numerous web sites and e-commerce providers to

,>--”

See http://ww\~.arbitrato~.orb/Senices/disput~-resolutioii-se~ices.htm
(last visited

Mar. 9,20021.
“78 http: //~c.w.claimresolv~r.com/ecAbout.nsf/~StaticContents)/.4bout?OpenDocument
(last visited Mar. 9, 20021.

2l‘ll

Id,
Id,

.’”’

http://~~~.claimresolver.com/ec.~b~~~t.risf/~StaticContents)/Fees?OpenDocument

2;‘.

[last visited Mar. 9, 2002).

”’ ICC Inrentoy, mprn note 770, at 6.
wi

Id. at 8.

””

See h t t p : / / ~ ~ ~ ~ . c l i c k I i s e t t l e . c o m / w h y ~ c n s(last
. c f ~visited
n
Mar. 9, 2002).
See http://www.clicknsettle.com/online-benefitsdm(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).

”’
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develop online ADR programs tailored to the providers’ needs.286
Cybersettle: this negotiation site started in August 1998,with the
objective of providing “confidential, automated, online dispute
resolution for users.”287The site claims to be the first company “to
offer an online, computer-assisted method for settling insurance
claims” and that their “patent-pending, blind-bid system helps
users resolve any monetary dispute with unprecedented speed and
total confidentiality.”288 The site has helped settle over
$50,000,000 in claims and has over 60,000 current users with 475
insurance companies using the service.‘Dg Settlements obtained
through Cybersettle are binding on the parties.29oThe site charges
a “successfee” ranging from 3 100 to $1,000, depending on the size
of the settlement.‘”
Electronic Consumer Dispute Resolution (ECODIR):this
project targeted the “establishment of an innovative service for the
prevention and the resolution of consumer conflicts arising in
cyberspace. It is aimed at offering to European consumers an
efficient, quick and affordable mechanism to solve their disputes
with on-line sellers.”292The three-part process includes negotiation, mediation, and recommendation the neutral mediator.
i-Courthouse: this arbitration site provides on-line adjudication
and dispute evaluation and re~olution.‘~~
Results are enforceable
by agreement of the parties.295
IntelliCOURT: this site provides online mediation and both
binding and non-binding arbitration services through
ArbitrationSoluti~ns.~~~

‘”’

See http://www.clicknsettle.com/sol-ecommerce.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
ICCInventoy, supra note 270, at 12.
’*’ http://www.cybersettle.com/about (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
*09 Id.
See Department ofCommerce and Federal Trade Cmnmi.ssion’sJoint Workshop on Altaative DLspute
Resolution f o r Online Consumer Tramactions 3, cat http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisreolution/
comments/barsamian.htm (last visited Mar. 9,2002) (comments of Anthony Barsamian).
*” http://www.cybersettle.com/faq (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
*’?
http://www.ecodir.org/odrp/details.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
2g3 Id.
2y4 See http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf
(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
*” See http://www.i-courthouse.com/main.taf?areal_ad=about&areaZ_id=faqs (lastvisited Mar. 9,2002).
m6 See http://www.intellicourt.com/about-us.htm1 (last visited Mar. 9,2002).
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IleveL: this mediation site permits both parties a finite time frame
to craft a solution; as an added incentive to reach settlement, the
site has created a Court of Public Opinion where failed reconciliation efforts are posted to a community repository.””
InternetNeutral: this mediation site started in 1997 to “offer
mediation services to resolve disputes between Internet businesses
and their customers or suppliers.”yq8 The mediations are nonbinding.20qAccording to the site, “mediation results in settlement
85% of the time.”’”‘’ There is a nonrefundable fee of $250 for two
hours of mediation session time plus two hours for reading and
preparation by the mediator, with additional fees for any additional
time.’”I
Mediation American: this site custom designs Web Based
Mediation Portals for clients seeking to engage in their own dispute
resolution or multi-purpose video conferencing. ’(”
Mediation Arbitration Resolution Services (MARS):this
mediation and arbitration site is “dedicated to providing an
accessible and exceptional dispute resolution process.” The site
handles all kinds of cases through its Super Settle ADR program
with blind bidding to reach a numerical settlement and its Fair &
Square ADR program involving a mediator.
Onlinemediators: this mediation site started January 2000,
offering online mediation for all kinds of disputes.”* The parties
determine whether the outcome will be binding.”” The site is
linked with onlineresolution.com, which offers online negotiation,
online mediation, online expert evaluation, and online
arbitration. ”(’
Online Ombuds Office: this mediation site started in June
1996,to provide online mediation services through ombudsmen for

”’

--

‘”,j

See http://www.ilevel.coni [lastvisited Mar. 9, 2002i.
‘w ICCIn7,entoy.mpra note 270, at 21.
’”’“ Id. at 22.
jilt
http://www.internetneutral.corn/nutshell.litm ;last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
IOI
See http://www.internetneutral.com/fees.litm ilast visited Mar. 9, 2002).
%I Y:
See l i t t p : / / \ ~ ~ ~ w . m e d i a t i o n a r n e n c a . c o m / s ~ ~ i c e s / i n (last
d e x .visited
~ p Mar. 9,2002).
<It I
http://www.resolvemydispute.corn/nistrnt.litm(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
”” See ICC Inumtory, supra note 270, at 28.
’‘Ii

’I“’

Id. at 30.
See http://www.onlineresolution.corn/services.cfrn ilast visited Mar. 9, 2002).
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disputes arising from any kind of online activity."' Ombudsmen
are independent officials who receive complaints, investigate
complaints, and make recommendation^.^^^ The site is the dispute
resolution arm of the Center for Information Technology and
Dispute Resolution at the University of Massachuset t ~ . ~The
'~
ombudsperson does not make a final decision on the dispute;
rather, the outcome of the mediation is a settlement agreement
between the parties. The enforceability of the settlement agreement is up to the par tie^.^"
National Arbitration Forum: this site offers arbitration,
mediation, and dispute resolution for domain name disputes and
other types of cases.31' Unless the parties specify otherwise, all
arbitration awards are final and binding.3"
Resolution Forum: this mediation and arbitration site provides
a conferencing system for the mediation and arbitration processes
for all business-related disputes.313The mission of this non-profit
educational organization is to "improve the quality and efficiency
Resolution Forum, Inc. works in
of dispute resolution
close association with the Center for Legal Responsibility at South
Texas College of Law."'"
ResolveItNow.com: this negotiation site was developed by a
California Superior Court Settlement Judge and a leading ADR
lawyer, expert, and consultant. The site uses blind bidding and
charges $150 per party for settlements at $3,000 or more; for
settlements less than $3,000, the parties pay five percent of the
settlement amount. l 6
Settlementonline.com: this negotiation site seeks "to improve
traditional methods ofresolving disputes by integrating the Internet

3117

'

See ICC Inuentoy, supra note 270, at 3 1.
See Katsh, supra note 225, at 966.
'" See Center for Informahon Technology and Dispute Resoluhon, 1, available at
http://www.ombuds.org/center/ombuds.html (last visited Mar. 9,2002).
'Io See ICC Inuentozy,supra note 270, at 32.
3'1 Seezd. at 45.
3 1 2 Id. at 49; see also http://www.arbforum.com/about/questions/asp (last visited Mar. 9,
2002).
313
See ICCInventozy, supra note 270, at 33.
3'4 http://www.resolutionforurn.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
3 1 5 Id.
3 1 b See http://www.resolveitnow.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
311R
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and related interactive services into the process.”317
Settleonline: this negotiation site offers an “online computer
assisted method for settling disputes by giving its users the power
to negotiate with total confidentiality.”“’8 ADR services are
provided by Resolute Systems Inc.“’”
Settlesmart: this site offers online confidential settlement
processes for disputes and lawsuits.”’
SquareTrade: this mediation site was started in the fall of 1999
to provide mediation in e-commerce transaction disputes.”” The
site handles disputes involving “non-delivery of goods or services,
misrepresentation, improper selling practices, un-honored guarantees or warranties, unsatisfactory services, credit and billing
problems, unfulfilled contracts, etc.”322Unless agreed upon by the
parties, the mediation is not binding.“‘j
The Claim Room: this negotiation and mediation site uses blind
bidding and confidential communication areas for text-based
negotiations; the site is designed to be used in support of traditional
“open” negotiations.“2’
USSettle.com: this site started in April 1999 to offer ADR
services to settle financial disputes through Web-based
technolo<gy.”’:’The site also provides mediators if the dispute does
not settle through the Web-based technology.“2G
Virtual Magistrate (VMAG):this free arbitration site started on
October 25, 1995, to resolve disputes among online computer
users, computer operations, and those harmed by the posting of
wrongful online message^."'^ VMAG started as a pilot project
funded by the National Center for Automated Information

http://www.settlernentonline.corn(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
ICC InaentoT, supra note 270,at 39.
”“ See http://www.settleonline.corn (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
”’“See http://www.settlesrnart.corn/how.htrn (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
See ICC Inomtoy, supra note 270, at 42.
12’’ See
h t t p : / / w w w .square trade .corn / c n t /js p / hl p / he 1p-o d r-cas e-fi le .j s p ;
jsessionid=vh3pwa70d2:vhost(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
.”’ Id. at 43; see aOo http://www.squaretrade.com/cnt/jsp/hlp/help-odr_case.jsp;
jsessionid=vh3pwa70d2?vhostid=t (last visited Mar. 9,2002).
http://www.theclaimroom.corn/visitors.htrnl(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
’”See http://www.ussettle.corn/howworks.htm(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
.Iii

,’IH

’”’

’”*
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See http://www.vmag.org (last visited Mar. 9,2002).
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Research and the Fellows of the Cyberspace Law Institute."" The
site is now run by the Chicago-Kent College of Law."'
WeCanSettle.com: this site uses "independent, neutral and
secure technology to compare offers from both sides and declares
a settlement when the figures are close enough."330
WebMediate: this site offers resolution services for online
transactions and insurance claims. Neutral mediators facilitate
discussions and negotiations between the parties, helping them
towards a solution.331The site also offers arbitration services.""2

'" See Vi~alMagistrateEstablishedfor the Internet, at http://www.eff.org/legal/Arbitration/
virtual-magistrate.announce (Mar. 4, 1996).

'" See http://www.vmag.org/docs/FAQ.htrnl (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
33"

33'
332

http://www.wecansettle.corn/pages/welcome.html(last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
See http://www.webmediate.com/faq.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
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